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The Correlation between income and voting is very different based on what part of the 
country a voter resides.  In rural areas, there is a strong and negative correlation between 
income and probability of voting for a Democratic Presidential Candidate, while in urban 
areas, the correlation is much weaker.  This paper shows that once you control for not 
only individual specific characteristics of voters but also geographic characteristics such 
as racial diversity, population density, and economic diversity, the regional differences 
between the effects of income on voting disappears.  One potential explanation for this 
geographical significance is in urban areas the high population density creates more 
interaction between economic classes that better allows more affluent individuals to 
observe the benefits associated with government redistribution more so than in a rural 
area.  These geographic characteristics play a similar role when examining how different 
regions of the country fund elementary and secondary public education (chapter 2) as 
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URBAN BLUES?  THE IMPACT OF POPULATION DENSITY 




A simple look at the Electoral College map for United States Presidential elections 
over the past 20 years reveals a striking consistency in the political geography of the 
United States.  The Democratic Party has solid support from the urban and wealthy states 
of the Northeast, Upper Midwest, and the West Coast; the Republican Party commands 
support in the rural areas of the South, Great Plains, and Southwest.  We not only see 
these patterns at the state level, but even at the county and precinct level of all states; the 
rural areas vote overwhelmingly Republican and urban areas are Democratic strongholds.  
This paper addresses the question of why we see such voting patterns around the country, 
namely, why income appears to affect voters differently depending on where in the 
country they reside.  More importantly, this paper asks if electoral preferences are formed 
through the isolated economic considerations of an individual, i.e. his or her own income 
or personal demographic factors, or if they can be shaped by the environment the 
surrounding the voter, such as the cultural and economic diversity of the area. 
Modern American political parties have created their platforms based on a log-rolling 
between two key issues:  economic and moral (Poole and Rosenthal 2000).  Economic 
issues include preferences over taxation, income redistribution, regulation, and public 
good provision. Moral issues include preferences over topics such as gay rights, school 




issues and the conventional wisdom suggests that the Republican Party is the party that 
favors lower taxation, less income redistribution, and fewer economic regulations on the 
economic side while opposing extension gay rights, and limits on prayer in schools and 
abortion on the moral side.  The Democratic Party favors higher levels of taxation, 
income redistribution, regulation and public good provisions while also favoring 
expansion of gay rights, limiting school prayer, and laws that allow for abortion.   
Focusing solely on economic issues, it seems clear to predict that the more affluent 
individuals of society would fit into the Republican camp, as greater levels of 
government expenditures and redistribution comes at a cost mainly to higher income 
earners.  The reverse would be true for lower (or zero) income earners, making them 
more likely to favor the Democratic Party (Gelman et al 2007).  The actual distribution of 
preferences is not as clear; there are many lower-income individuals who vote 
Republican, and many Democrats are quite wealthy individuals.   
Figure 1.1 illustrates the correlation between income and the probability of voting for 
the Republican Presidential candidate in the 2000 and 2004 elections for 3 states, the 
richest state, Connecticut, the poorest state, Mississippi, and a middle income state, Ohio.  
This shows that the naïve labels we place on parties tend to hold within a state; the more 
income an individual earns the more likely they are to vote republican.  The pattern of 
poor states voting republican and rich states voting democrat signally that rich people in 
blue states are democrat and poor people in red states are republican is an ecological 
fallacy illustrated by the black dots in the figure.  The puzzle of this picture is that income 




Income matters quite a bit for low income states such as Mississippi, yet for a wealthy 
state such at Connecticut, the correlation between income and voting is not strong at all. 
A seemingly obvious explanation of this pattern is as stated earlier, economic issues 
are not the only issues on a party’s platform and while income does affect a voter’s stance 
on economic issues (Ansolabehere et. al.  2006), it has nothing to do with their stance on 
moral issues.  If a voter votes contrary to what appears to be his or her economic 
considerations then it is possible that it is his or her moral preferences driving the 
decision.  This is exactly what Thomas Frank (2004) claims are driving the political 
geography of the nation.  In his view, this can explain why a rich individual would vote 
against their economic self-interest.  Frank (2004) argues that only once we consider that 
people vote based on their moral stances rather than economic self-interest can we 
explain the electoral geography of the United States.  His claim however is based on the 
assumption that if a low income state votes Republican the low income voters in that 
state vote republican and vice versa for high income states.  Gelman et. al (2007) and 
figure 1.1 show that is not the case. 
However, one can simply infer that the wealthy individuals in urban states care 
more about moral issues than economic so vote with the Democratic Party even though 
they seemingly go against their economic self-interest.  But work by Ansolabehere et al. 
(2006) and Bartels (2007, 2010) show that individuals consistently place more weight on 
economic issues in vote choice.  Not only that, Ansolabehere et. al (2006) states that:  
“The bottom line of these analysis is clear […] there is not a single group for which the 




Issues scale, and the coefficients are strikingly stable across groups (pg. 109-110, 2006).”  
In light of this, the voting behavior of rich individuals in highly urban areas again 
becomes a puzzle.   
This paper discusses the idea that it is the economic and moral circumstance not 
just of the voter, but of the immediate environment around the voter that shapes their 
preferences.  Shown in the work of Gelman et al. (2007) there is no real puzzle for how 
poor people vote but rich people vote differently depending on where in the country they 
live.  Rich voters in all areas are more likely to vote Republican than poor voters, but in 
the densely populated urban regions of the nation, income does not play as significant a 
role.  If we assume that both moral and economic preferences shape voting choices, if 
there is not a difference in the weight upper income earners place on moral issues 
compared to lower income earners (Ansolabehere et. al. 2006), then there has to be 
another explanation. 
While moral issues are a significant contributor to electoral preferences (roughly 
30% of the poorest individuals still vote Republican in most states (figure 1.1)), this 
paper investigates whether Frank’s (2004) argument is given too much strength because 
of the economic environment that surrounds individual voters.  The variance in how 
income impacts the voting patterns of the affluent could be based on the idea that in the 
wealthy, urban areas of the nation, the more affluent voters are more likely to come into 
contact with other cultural and economic classes due to higher population density. This 
increased interaction allows the affluent voters to witness the benefits of income 




identical affluent voter in a rural area with less interaction between lower classes due to 
lower population density.   
The main contribution of this paper is to show that if you consider only consider 
the moral and economic stances of an individual voter (i.e. income, age, education level, 
marital status, race), you still have this divergence in the correlation of income and voting 
patterns across the country.  Once you consider the environmental aspects of the voter’s 
(age distribution, income inequality, population density, racial diversity) geographic area, 
the differences in the impact of income on voting disappear.  The paper proceeds as 
follows:  section 2 presents the literature review on the topic and provide more 
background, section 3  presents the data and empirical evidence showing once geographic 
factors are controlled for the differences across regions seem to disappear.  Section 4 sets 
forth a simple model that attempts to explain why geography matters complete with 
empirical evidence.  Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
II.  Literature 
Economic Vs. Moral Preferences 
In order to determine why people vote the way they do we much first know what 
preferences are driving their decisions.  Political parties do not create single issue 
platforms and so to better understand voters and their preferences we will divide party 
platforms into two major issue groups:  economic and moral issues.  Economic issues for 
instance involve policies such as taxation, provision of public goods, and most 
importantly for this paper, redistribution.  Moral issues on the other hand focus on issues 




Those who argue that the American electorate is polarized contend that it is moral 
issues, not economic that are driving voter preferences (Frank 2004).  However recent 
work has come a long way to show that economic issues are at the forefront in voters’ 
minds (Ansolabehere et al 2006, Bartels 2006 and 2010, Fiorina and Abrams 2008, and 
Walsh 2009).  This line of research used survey data on how voters feel about certain 
issues to rank each voter on a liberal-conservative scale on both economic and moral 
issues. (I.e. a conservative on the economic scale would favor low taxes, less 
redistribution and smaller government where a conservative on the moral scale would 
favor laws against abortion, gay rights, and for prayer in school).  This research has 
shown that while Americans are certainly more polarized on moral issues than economic 
issues, the weight that voters place on economic issues is consistently higher.  Some 
evidence of this is that in Frank’s (2004) argument, it is the poor people who are being 
wooed by the Republican Party due to their moral stances.  This is not true as the poorest 
20% of the nation overwhelmingly supports the Democratic Party, regardless the state 
they reside (Gelman et al. 2007).  What this does not say is that moral preferences do not 
matter.  As the empirical results of this paper will illustrate (see tables), variables that are 
not proxies for economic stances (such as race, gender, marital status, and religious 
attendance) have large and significant impacts on voting behavior.  What this does say is 
that there is not a difference in the impact moral preferences have on affluent voters 
compared to lower income earners (Ansolabehere 2006).  One argument this paper 




consider that the economic and social environment of the area around an individual 
shapes their electoral preferences. 
Population Density, Income Inequality, and Redistribution 
There has been a wealth of literature pointing to the conclusion that we would expect 
urban areas to be more in favor of higher levels of redistribution (Rodden 2010, Bartles 
2010, Glaeser and Ward 2005, Glaeser et al. 2008) but the literature has focused on solely 
on the voting of the poor that is driving this effect instead of looking at how the top half 
if the income spectrum vote, which is what this paper investigates.  While income 
inequality exists all over the country, there is no doubt that there is a greater 
concentration of lower-class individuals in cities than in rural areas (Glaeser and Kahn, 
2008).  This has historically been driven by the fact that even though the poor may be 
faced with higher unemployment in urban areas the higher expected wage found in cities 
compared to the farm drove the lower class into the cities (Rodden 2010 and 2005). 
Meltzer and Richard (1981) set forward a model describing how much redistribution 
one should expect from a government elected my majoritarian vote with universal 
suffrage.  The theory predicts that as income inequality grows, which can be interpreted 
as more poor people moving into an area holding all else constant, we would expect to 
see the policies of the government to favor more redistribution as the poor votes 
outnumber the rich.  However, there is little evidence suggesting a strong correlation 
between income inequality and the level of redistribution we would expect in the United 
States given what we see in other countries around the world (Gelman et al. 2010, Dion 




the highest levels of inequality occur, yet southern voting patterns suggest much lower 
preferences for redistribution than other sections of the nation.  A key reason for this is 
voter turnout; empirical evidence suggests that in many cases, voter turnout of the poor 
us much lower than their affluent counterparts (Galbraith and Hale 2008, Rosenstone 
1982), but in cases where voter turnout is high, driven mainly by more poor individuals 
voting, there seems to be a trend toward better performance by the Democratic Party 
(Hansford and Gomes 2012).  What this suggests is that if the poor have poor voter 
turnout, then the policies of the elected officials are decided by the more affluent voters 
(Gilens et al. 2011), meaning it is mainly their views on redistribution that drives 
outcomes and not simply the inequality of an area. 
Nearly all previous literature on the impact of urbanization and income inequality and 
its relation to voting patterns favoring high redistribution all focus on the voting patterns 
of the poor.  While there is certainly a large driver for a good portion of the electorate, the 
voting patterns of the poor are not a mystery, what this paper looks at is why the voting 
patterns of upper income earners differ across the geography of the nation; in particular, 
why do the more affluent individuals in cities seem to favor redistribution much more 
than their rural counterparts.  A key theoretical argument comes from Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006).  Their theory explains why we see similar social programs in nations 
despite differing government structures.  For example, A dictator who has sole control 
over the countries policy may choose to give away some of their resources by means of 
redistribution and social welfare programs.  In this case, though they prefer their 




control, they are quite willing to do so.  The same can be said for a rich individual in an 
unequal society, though they would love to keep their money, social 
harmony/maintaining the status quo is desirable, so if one can relinquish some resources 
to better maintain harmony, some people would vote for that.  Additionally, high levels 
of income inequality are associated with higher crime (Alesina and Giuliano 2009).  If 
crime is a function of income inequality, reducing the benefits of crime through a more 
equitable distribution of income may also be a useful crime deterrent (Alesina and 
Giuliano 2009).  There are other reasons urban areas would favor more redistribution and 
public good expenditure than rural areas.  Since the concentration of individuals is so 
much higher in urban areas the cost of certain public good such as mass transit are much 
more efficiently provided that they would be in the rural areas.  For example, a bus route 
that serves the same number of people in an urban area and a rural area would have to 
cover much more ground in the rural area thus providing a costlier service to the same 
amount of people.  The private provision of redistribution, otherwise known has charity 
also has efficiency implications due to rural and urban considerations. 
Redistribution is not solely done by the government.  Individuals can choose to 
privately donate some of their income to others, which we call charity.  Any discussion of 
society’s preference for redistribution is incomplete without reference to the relationship 
between public and private redistribution.  A number of articles have addressed the issue 
of the relationship between private provisions of public goods in the presence of public 




as a strict public good subject to the same free-riding problems associated with pure 
public goods of the Samuelson (1954) approach. 
Brooks (2006) provides an extensive survey of charity in the United States.  The big 
findings of his research are that Republicans (rural wealthy voters) give much larger 
percentages of their income
1
 to charity than Democrats (low income and urban wealthy 
voters).  This discrepancy seems to be driven by two key issues.  One is that religious 
individuals give much more to charity than non-religious individuals, of which there is a 
larger tendency for a Republican to be religious than a Democrat.  The second is an 
individual’s view of the role of government in redistribution.  Namely, Republicans 
believe that redistribution can be accomplished by the private sector much more 
efficiently so the government need not worry with it.  On the other hand, Democrats feel 
private redistribution is not sufficient to handle the demand for redistribution due to the 
public good aspect, leading to a preference for greater government involvement and 
forced (through taxation) redistribution.  The quality of interactions also plays a role in 
the effectiveness of private charity.  In rural areas the interactions between economic 
classes are more often familiar and repetitive, leading one to expect this to increase the 
efficiency of private charity.  For example, an individual is more likely to privately 
redistribute income to an individual they know well as opposed to a random poor person 
on the street.  The converse of this takes effect in an urban area; with many anonymous 
interactions, it is more difficult to coordinate private redistribution without government 
assistance. 
                                                 
1




  The religious aspect captures that charity may not be a pure public good as there is 
some “Joy of Giving” associated with charity (i.e. you gain more utility by actually 
giving a poor person your dollar than simply knowing the poor person will get a dollar). 
Additionally religious views could act as a third party enforcement mechanism that 
reduces the free-riding of others charitable activities (i.e. if you want to get to heaven you 
have to be charitable).  Due to the increased free-riding problem of charity in urban areas, 
even if urban and rural areas required the same amount of total redistribution, the urban 
voters would still vote for a larger percentage to come from public redistribution because 
private redistribution in urban areas is not as efficient as in rural areas. 
Economic Segregation 
A critical assumption of this paper is there is an interaction between social classes.  
This of course is determined by the level of economic segregation there is in an area.  
Recent studies have shown that economic segregation has increased in recent years 
(Jargowsky 1996 and Glaeser et al. 2008) and that the most economically segregated 
portions of the country are those in the northeastern urban areas and areas such as San 
Francisco (Dwyer 2010).  Some studies however have shown that there is a considerable 
amount of income mixing within communities (Hardman and Ioannides, 2004).  Even in 
the instances of extreme economic segregation, the measure is computed where 
individuals live.  Even though a person may live in a gated community if the suburbs if 
they work in the center city there is still much room for interactions with other economic 
classes to take place.  Additionally there must be some force that maintains the 




money, loiter, etc.  In such a situation an individual may be economically segregated 
because there is such a system of social welfare and redistribution in place the poor are 
satisfied in their segregated communities.   
Other than diverse economic interactions, within areas there are also diverse racial or 
cultural interactions that may drive individuals’ electoral preferences.  Alesina et al. 
(1999) showed that in areas that are very ethnically fragmented there is less provision of 
public goods by the local government.  This comes from the idea that if there are many 
groups that separate themselves it is difficult to agree on a public good that inevitably one 
group will have more access to than the other, with the equilibrium outcome becoming, 
no public good is provided.  However in these areas, while local provision of public 
expenditure was lower, total government spending was higher and that increased 
spending comes by way of an intergovernmental transfer from the Federal level.  This 
provides some evidence for highly diverse areas (more often than not, urban areas) 
demanding large Federal government expenditures (more democratic voting). 
III. Data and Empirics 
To show the impact of including the demographics of the surrounding geographic 
area of a voter this paper uses two survey datasets.  The first dataset is the National 
Election Survey (NES).  This survey is use for the Presidential elections of 2000, 2004, 
and 2008 and contains demographic data for each respondent (income, gender, age, race, 
education, and marital status) along with which presidential candidate he or she voted for, 
and most importantly for this project, the congressional district he or she resides.  The 




to the NES in that it contains the same demographic information for each respondent 
along with who he or she voted for.  However, instead of containing the congressional 
district the voter resides, the survey only contains the state.  The Annenberg survey has 
many more observations than the NES survey (approximately 26,399 for NAES 
compared to 3082 for NES).   
Figure 1.2 shows the recreation of Gelman’s (2007) picture presented in figure 1 
using the NES survey data.  This figure again shows the correlation between income and 
probability of voting for the republican candidate in the 2000, 2004 and 2008 presidential 
elections.  The blue line represents Connecticut and the red line represents Mississippi.  
We see results similar to Gelman’s picture in that the simple correlation between income 
and voting is very strong in Mississippi, a rural state, but not so in Connecticut, an urban 
state.  However it’s important to understand that this figure controls for nothing aside 
from income.  It is important to understand how much of these regional variations can be 
attributed to moral preferences and further how much can be attributed to the 
environment the voter lives.  To control for the other individual demographic variables 
the impact electoral preference a simple probit model was run using vote choice as the 
dependent variable where 1 corresponds to a democratic vote and 0 corresponds to a 
republican vote.  The first control was to only use demographic factors which include 
age, gender, education, race, marital status, and religious service attendance.  After 
controlling for just these variables vote choice was predicted and then compared to 




The solid lines are the same lines as in figure 1.2 yet the dotted lines are once we 
control for variables that are proxy for moral preferences.  Once moral preferences are 
controlled for, there is a shift in how income matters which suggests that Mississippi is 
more morally conservative than Connecticut.  However, the slopes of the two lines do not 
change much, income still matters more for Mississippi than it does for Connecticut.  
While this could be the case that voters in Connecticut are fundamentally different from 
voters in Mississippi, being that they don’t respond to the same incentives, it could also 
be the case that it is the underlying characteristics of the areas these voters live, that 
drives the differences, which is the claim this paper is making.   
Figure 1.4 represents the main contribution of this paper to the literature.  Figure 1.4 
takes the same simple probit regression run on vote choice but adds geographic specific 
variables which include, Gender make-up of the district, median age of the district, ethnic 
fragmentation (computed identically as Alesina et. al. 1999), income inequality 
(measured by median income divided by 10
th
 percentile of income), population density, 
and the interaction between population density and income inequality, which is a measure 
for how much interaction there is between economic classes.  The dashed lines in figure 
1.4 show the relationship between income and voting after controlling for all the 
variables including the environmental variables around the voter.  This shows that once 
these variables are controlled for there is not much difference between Mississippi and 
Connecticut at all, and income has a similar effect on both. 
The question then becomes, why these environmental factors appear to matter?  




even if decisions aren’t made collectively, an individual still considers the views of those 
around him or her when determining policy preferences.  What determines the level that 
an individual cares about their surrounding environment is a function of how much 
interaction between the environment and voter there is.  These interactions happen much 
more in urban settings than in rural settings due to high population density.  The next 
section presents a simple model that formalizes this situation and then discusses some of 
the empirical evidence in support. 
IV. Benchmark Model 
This section presents my benchmark model for the role population density and 
income inequality play in an individual’s electoral preferences.  The first assumption is 
voters only care about economic issues.  We will assume there are two types of people in 
the country, wealthy and poor, and normalize the population to 1, with θ representing the 
percentage of the population who are wealthy.  There are two types of areas an individual 
can live in, urban (U) or rural (R).  Let   be the percentage of wealthy people who live in 
the urban area, and λ be the percent of poor people living in the urban area.  By 
assumption: 
     (   )  (   )  (   )(   )                                 (1) 
I.e. more people live in the urban area than the rural area.  Also we will assume that in 
each area the poor outnumber the wealthy, i.e.  (   )     and (   )(   )>(  
 ) . 
 Next, let us assume that each wealthy person has income of  ( ) where t is the tax 




have income of zero, but receive lump-sum redistribution from wealthy individuals 
through the public sector.  The consumption of a rich individual is:  
  
  (   ) ( )                                              (2) 
Where W denotes a wealthy individual and i denotes the area they live in i=U, R for 
urban or rural respectively.  The poor receive lump sum redistribution of all tax revenue.  
The Government taxes only the wealthy ( ) at rate t so that, 
              ( )                                          (3) 
Total revenue is assumed to be distributed equally to poor individuals regardless of their 
location, making the consumption of each poor person is: 
  
  
   ( )
(   )
                                                          (4) 
The tax rate is chosen by political party elected by majority rule.  The next step of the 
model is to define the preferences of each individual. 
 Wealthy individuals have preferences over their own consumption but are also 
altruistic towards the relative consumption of the poor in their own area.  This means that 
utility of a wealthy individual is decreasing as inequality in consumption between the 
poor and wealthy grows.  As states earlier, this assumption comes from as the fact that as 
inequality increases negative environmental factors also increase such as crime (Alesina 
and Giuliano 2001).  However, the degree to which a rich individual cares about the 
poor’s consumption depends on the probability of interaction with poor people.  We will 
use population density as a proxy for this probability.  We will assume for simplicity that 




of an area determines completely the relative population density.  The Utility function for 
a wealthy voter can therefore be expressed as: 
  
    
 ( )  (
 
     ( )
)                                      (5) 
Where   
  is the level of Consumption of a rich person in area i,    is the population 
density of district i, and   ( ) is the inequality in consumption in district i measured by 
the consumption of the wealthy,   
 , divided by the consumption of the poor,   
 ( ).  
This means that as population density increases for a given level of inequality, utility of 
that individual falls.  A poor individual on the other hand, only cares about his own 
consumption, so:  
  
    
 ( )                                                            (6) 
 
The utility function is concave in consumption,      and      . 
 
 Through the political process, each party will choose a tax rate, and the voters will 
vote for the party that is closest to their ideal tax rate, found by the tax rate that 
maximizes each voter’s utility.  It is clear from the preferences of the poor and regardless 
of the urban or rural district a poor individual will choose the tax rate that maximizes 
total tax revenue.  Therefore, the tax rate desired for a poor individual is the tax rate such 
that: 
 ( )    
  
  
                                         (7) 
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For the urban district and, 
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For the rural district, which implies a wealthy individual in the urban district will  
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And for the rural district, 
 
 
(   )
   (   ) (   )
   ( )  (   )
  
  
                             (14) 
 
Equations (13) and (14) tell us that the impact of taxation on consumption is the exact 
same for a wealthy individual regardless what district they reside but the impact taxation 
has on reducing the disutility of inequality depends on the percentage of the nation’s poor 
who live in the district compared to the percentage of wealthy and the population density 
of an area.  From table 1 we see that income inequality is larger in the more densely 




hand side of equation (13) and (14) will be smaller for wealthy individuals in the 
urban district meaning they would have a higher ideal tax rate than their rural 
counterparts.  We can also conclude that the wealthy, either urban or rural will both 
have lower ideal tax rates than the poor in any area.  Therefore we can rank the 
optimal tax rates of each group by size and infer that the poor’s preferred tax rate will 
exceed the preferred tax rate of the urban wealthy which will exceed the preferred tax 
rate of the rural wealthy, or: 
  
 
   
     
                                                                     (15) 
 
The key takeaway from this benchmark model is that the wealthy urban voter 
demands more redistribution than does his rural counterpart.  Assuming no private means 
of redistribution, this is enough to conclude that wealthy individuals in urban areas will 
prefer higher tax rates and a larger government than their rural counterparts.  However, 
there are private means of redistribution through the use of charity that, if present in an 
area, would lessen the need for government redistribution.  If we consider charity a 
partial public good (i.e. I benefit from a dollar given to the poor regardless who gives it), 
the more individuals there are in an area the greater the difference between the 
equilibrium level of redistribution (no government redistribution) and the efficient level 
(amount demanded) (Samuelson 1954).  If an urban area has more people than a rural 
area private charity will be less able to satisfy a given level of redistribution due to the 
spillover effects of private charitable giving.  Coupled with the fact that cities demand 




demand higher taxation and government redistribution than rural rich voters even in the 
presence of charitable giving. 
During the process of electoral competition each political party will choose the 
tax rate that maximizes their probability of winning the election.  We will assume each 
candidate is office motivated but faces a primary election such that the general election 
tax rates will not converge to one another (Owen and Grofman 2006).  Given the 
Republican platform for smaller government and less income redistribution compared to 
the Democrats we will assume that the tax rate of the Republican platform, tR will be less 
than the tax rate of the Democratic platform tD.  Given the current model, if the poor 
outnumber the rich and everyone votes then a party can guarantee election by selecting a 
tax rate that maximized revenue.  Of course in real life we do not see such a tax rate nor 
do we see full participation in elections, namely the least likely to vote are the poor 
(Hansford and Gomes, 2012).  Since the poor are less likely to vote the median voter in 
this model will be the wealthy in the urban districts.  Each political party will choose a 
tax rate on either side of the wealthy urban voters thus making the rural rich always 
voting Republican, the poor, regardless of location always voting for the Democrat and 
the swing voters of the election being the wealthy in the urban district.   
To test this theory we again use data from the NES and NAES surveys.  While the 
theoretical model made the assumption income, inequality, and population density were 
the only variable of interest, there are many more variables the influence electoral 
decisions.  As such, the empirical model will control for as many of these as possible.  




attendance and its frequency, educational attainment, race, female-to-male ratio of the 
district, median age of the district, and the ethnic fragmentation of the district (the 
probability that any two randomly drawn individuals are of different ethnicity (Alesina et 
al. 1999)).  The variables of interest will be the measure of inequality of a district, 
population density and inequality multiplied population density to give a proxy for the 
degree of interaction between economic groups.  For measuring inequality this paper uses 
three measures.  The main measure is the ratio of median income to the 10
th
 percentile of 
income of each district.  The other two measures used as robustness checks are the ratio 
of mean to median income of the district and the ratio of the 90
th
 percentile income to the 
10
th
 percentile income of a district. 
Table 1.1 shows the sample means and standard deviations for each of the variables 
in the empirical model.  It also splits the sample based on population density to visualize 
what the differences are in the populations aside from population density which also 
illustrate the need to control for these variables.  The sample is divided between the top 
half densely populated congressional districts vs. the bottom half and then again by the 
top quarter of densely populated congressional districts compared to the bottom quarter 
of densely populated congressional districts.  Table 1.1 shows there are significant 
differences in the makeup of the more urban areas of the country compared to the rural 
areas.  We see that income is higher in cities where the citizens are slightly younger on 
average, and city dwellers are less likely to be married than their rural counterparts.  
Somewhat interestingly urban areas report attending church at a higher rate than rural 




with greater frequency.  In terms of education urban areas are more educated with lower 
levels of high school drop outs and higher levels of college and advanced degrees.  Urban 
areas tend to be more ethnically diverse while at the same time have a higher female-to-
male ratio than rural areas.  In particular the female-to-male ratio has been explained by 
Edlund (2005) who claims that women migrate to cities for better mating circumstances.  
In terms of income inequality, income skewness as a whole is larger in urban areas as 





 percentile incomes.  Finally in terms of voting outcomes as clearly visible 
by the Electoral College map of the United States, urban areas vote overwhelmingly more 
democratic than rural areas. 
Table 1.2 presents the regression results on how population density and income 
inequality impact voter preference controlling for the other variables that could also 
impact preferences using the NES survey.  Since the dependent variable is binary 
(0=Republican Presidential vote, 1=Democratic Presidential Vote), the model was fit 
using a probit regressions clustering the standard errors by state.  Each of these 
regressions uses a slightly different specification to capture the effect of inequality on 
voting outcomes.  Regressions (1) and (2) use the ratio of median income to the 10
th
 
percentile income as the measure of inequality, regression (3) and (4) use the ratio of 
mean to median income and regression (5) and (6) use the ratio of 90
th
 percentile income 
to 10
th
 percentile income.  Each income percentile and population density is for the 
corresponding congressional district of the voter, which is the smallest unit of geographic 




income inequality term, population density and the income inequality term multiplied by 
population density where the even numbered regressions only include the inequality term 
multiplied by population density
2
.  Both specifications are used to test the impact of 
population density on voting outcomes, if population density does not have an impact on 
voting we should expect that the interaction term would have a lower magnitude and 
significance once included with inequality by itself. 
Using the sample means and sample standard deviations reported in table 1.5, a one 
standard deviation increase in population density holding all else equal will increase the 
probability of voting for the Democratic Presidential candidate by 8.65 percentage points 
using regression (1), though this result is not statistically significant.  Using regression 2, 
a one standard deviation increase in population density increases the probability of voting 
for a Democratic candidate by 8.14 percentage points and is statistically significant.  The 
lack of significance of population density when included with the interaction term is 
believed to be due to the small sample size of the survey, and the high level of correlation 
between density and the interaction term (.9870).  Henceforth, each table will only use 
the median-10
th
 percentile ratio as the income inequality term but divide the sample to 
check for robustness of these results.  In Appendix A are the same regressions but using 
OLS as opposed to Probit as a robustness check.  The results with OLS are quite 
comparable.  
                                                 
2
 Using only the interaction between population density and income inequality without including both 
population density and income inequality separately imposes homothetic preferences on the functional 




Table 1.3 reports the regressions results from dividing the county into regions.  As 
apparent from the Electoral College maps there are certain areas of the country that are 
very strongly democratic, to check if these highly urban areas bias the results we split the 
sample into states that hare highly democratic along the west coast and northeast and all 
the other states.  Regression (1) is the full sample and identical to those reported in 
column (1) of table 1.2.  Regression (2) includes only the highly democratic coastal states 
(These states include:  ME, VT, MA, CT, RI, NY, NJ, MD, DE, CA, OR, WA, and HI).  Finally 
Regression (3) includes all the states aside from the highly democratic coastal states. A 
one standard deviation increase in population density (found in table 1.5) will increase 
the probability of voting for the democratic candidate by 7.8 percentage points for the 
coastal areas, and 5.1 percentage points for the non-coastal areas.  While this effect is 
insignificant for the coastal areas it is statistically significant with the non-coastal areas. 
An interesting aspect of table 1.4 is how the other control variables impact voting 
when the sample is separated. For instance, simply attending church is not a significant 
predictor of voting along the coasts but is in the rest of the country.  Additionally, ethnic 
fragmentation is not a significant predictor using the entire sample or just the coastal 
areas but is significant and large in magnitude for the non-coastal areas of the nation.  
This can be explained with the findings that altruism and preferences for redistribution 
tend to be less the traveling across racial lines.  What this shows is that in the non-coastal 
areas the poor are disproportionately concentrated in a racial minority driving those areas 




fragmentation is larger, we don’t a single ethnic group concentrated along the lower end 
of the income spectrum (Alesina and Giuliano 2009). 
The final subsampling, creating the main regression results for the paper, divides the 
sample into income earners who make greater than the median income of their district 
(regression (2)), and income earners who make less than the median income of their 
district (regression (3)).  These results are reported in tables 1.4.  This subsampling was 
chosen because this paper is trying to explain the differences in how the more affluent 
vote around the country.  In this regard we would expect population density to have a 
larger impact on upper income earners rather than the lower income earners since 
theoretically an individual in the bottom half of the income spectrum will be the 
beneficiary of income redistribution regardless of population density.  The data shows 
that this does in fact hold.  For a one standard deviation increase in population density, an 
individual in the top half of the income distribution will increase their probability of 
voting for the Democratic Presidential candidate by between approximately 12.6 
percentage points where the impact on a lower income earner is approximately 4.8 
percentage points.  Additionally even when population density and income inequality are 
included with the interaction term, the interaction term is still positive and significant.  
Yet again, these results are not statistically significant.  But Figure 4 showed that while 
each individual variable may nor be significant, controlling for these environmental 
factors all together does have a big impact on how income impact voter preference.  
For a check of robustness tables 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 report the results from the probit 




observations than the NES survey but the lowest level of geography that is identified for 
each voter is the state they reside.  Because of this the inequality and population density 
measure is not as precise as those used with the NES data.  The Annenberg Survey 
regressions report similar findings as the NES results with the exception that the 
magnitudes are lower, yet the finding are much more significant.  This makes since sense 
because if I take the statewide population density measure it will overstate rural areas 
local population density and understate urban areas local population density.  Using the 
sample means and sample standard deviations from table 8, for the full sample a one 
standard deviation increase in population density increases the probability of voting for 
the Democratic candidate by approximately 3.8 percentage points.  The effect of an 
increase in population density jumps to 5.1 percentage points when using upper income 
earners compared to 2.4 percentage points with the lower income earners.  These findings 
are similar to the findings of the NES survey but just a smaller magnitude, yet statistically 
significant.  But to state again, the NAES results show that the interaction between 
population density and income inequality is significant at the 1% level.  This suggests 
that the small sample size coupled with the high correlation of population density and the 
interaction between density and income inequality of the NES survey could be the reason 
for the lack of significance in those regressions. 
V. Conclusion 
In the last 20 years the Electoral College map of the United States has had a familiar 
look.  The majority of the country either falls into a solidly Republican state or a solidly 




election.  Deeper investigation into this pattern is that the most solidly Democratic states 
also tend to be the most urban, densely populated states while the solid Republican states 
tend to me more rural and sparsely populated.  Previous research on voting trends has 
concluded that lower income individuals have similar voting patterns regardless of their 
residence while the voting patterns of upper income earners differs greatly depending on 
where the individual lives (Gelman et al 2007).   
Though some have attributed this variation in voting to moral and cultural issues such 
as race, gender, marital status, and religion; recent research has shown that even when 
controlling for these individual specific traits, there is still this variation in how income 
impacts vote preference.  This paper makes the claim that it is the environmental factors a 
voter lives in that also drives his or her preferences.  The factors which include gender 
makeup, age, ethnic fragmentation, income inequality, all of which become more of a 
factor as population density increases, shape the political preferences of voters the same 
was as individual characteristics such as income and education do.  Once we control for 
these environmental factor we see there is not a systematic difference in voters who live 
in rural areas or urban areas, just that in urban areas these environmental factors have a 
much larger influence.   
Further, densely populated urban areas create an atmosphere where there are greater 
interactions between social and economic groups which help drive the preferences of 
upper income earners to match those of low income earners, which can help explain why 
upper income earners in the urban sections of the country vote more Democratically than 




redistribution in these areas or simply more government expenditure in these areas is 
unknown.  In the 2008 presidential election there were seven states (NM, FL, NC, VA, 
OH, IN, and WI) where the margin of victory was less than 6.8 percentage points and 
each regression predicted that a one standard deviation increase in population density 
increased the probability of voting for a Democratic candidate by more than 6.8 
percentage points.  The results of this paper have shown that voters are not systematically 
difference across regions; they respond similarly to similar factors, just face different 
factors based on where they live.  This means that as more and more individuals move 
into cities through time and population density of many parts of the country increases 
(namely in the south), the results of this paper provide evidence that these shifts in 
demographics could bring with it substantial political economy ramifications and is an 





Figure 1.1:  Correlation between income and Voting for the 2000 and 2004 US 
Presidential Election.  Note:  Solid dots represent average state income; empty dots 
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Figure 1.3:  Relationship between voting and income after controlling for moral 
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Figure 1.4:  The Relationship of Voting and Income once environmental factors around 






































Table 1.1:  Sample Means of the survey data of relevant variables between differing population densities 
using NES (By Congressional District)  year 2000, 2004 and 2008 
Variable Full Sample Top Half Bottom Half Top Quartile 
Bottom 
Quartile 
Vote Choice (d) .584 .650*** .519*** .698*** .553*** 
 (.492) (.476) (.499) (.459) (.497) 
Income in 10000s 
of dollars 
5.781 6.035*** 5.530*** 6.185*** 5.077*** 
(4.282) (4.334) (4.216) (4.341) (4.090) 
Age 48.339 47.431*** 49.234*** 46.745*** 49.727*** 
 (16.517) (16.364) (16.623) (16.336) (17.144) 
Female (d) .559 .559 .559 .546 .539 
 (.496) (.496) (.496) (.498) (.498) 
Marital Status (d) .514 .474*** .554*** .455*** .528*** 
 (.499) (.499) (.497) (.498) (.499) 
Church Attendance 
(d) 
.434 .455*** .412*** .472* .430* 
(.496) (.498) (.492) (.499) (.495) 
Church Every Week 
(d) 
.273 .250*** .295*** .223*** .291*** 
(.445) (.433) (.456) (.417) (.454) 
High School 
Dropout (d) 
.0749 .069* .081* .077* .103* 
(.263) (.254) (.272) (.267) (.304) 
College Degree (d) .213 .218 .207 .260*** .175*** 
 (.409) (.413) (.405) (.439) (.380) 
Advanced Degree 
(d) 
.111 .119* .103* .114* .098* 
(.314) (.324) (.305) (.318) (.297) 
Black (d) .184 .234*** .135*** .254*** .178*** 
 (.388) (.423) (.342) (.435) (.383) 
Hispanic (d) .094 .103* .084* .137*** .089*** 
 (.292) (.305) (.278) (.344) (.285) 
Other Race (d) .065 .081*** .049*** .100*** .055*** 
 (.247) (.273) (.217) (.300) (.228) 
Female-Male Ratio 1.041 1.051*** 1.032*** 1.055*** 1.031*** 
 (.050) (.060) (.035) (.079) (.039) 
Median Age 36.409 35.869*** 36.941*** 34.921*** 36.574*** 
 (3.099) (2.957) (3.143) (2.902) (2.738) 
Ethic 
Fragmentation 
.352 .427*** .279*** .509*** .301*** 
(.161) (.144) (.142) (.119) (.149) 
Population Density 
(1000s/sq. mi) 1.867 3.661*** .098*** 6.694*** .047*** 




4.006 4.084*** 3.929*** 4.155*** 4.038*** 




10.747 10.992*** 10.506*** 11.485*** 10.977*** 
(2.972) (3.315) (2.569) (3.748) (2.727) 
Obs 3082 1530 1552 759 783 
Note:  (d) refers to a dummy variable where the only two outcomes are 0 and 1 
*Denotes the difference in means is significant at the 90% level 
***Denotes the difference in means is significant at the 99% level 
The top half, bottom half, top quartile and bottom quartile refer to the top half and top quartile of 




Table 1.2:  NES (Congressional District) Marginal Effect of Probit Regression on Vote Choice 
0=Republican 1=Democrat 
(Std. Errors are presented in parenthesis and clustered by state for robustness) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income in $10000s -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married Female (d) 0.054* 0.052* 0.053* 0.052* 0.054* 0.053* 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Single Female (d) 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
Married Male (d) -0.028 -0.029 -0.029 -0.030 -0.028 -0.029 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Church Attendance (d) -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.068*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Church Every Week (d) -0.245*** -0.244*** -0.245*** -0.245*** -0.245*** -0.245*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
High School Dropout 
(d) 
0.105*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.107*** 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
College Degree (d) 0.051** 0.052** 0.052** 0.052** 0.051** 0.052** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.137*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Black (d) 0.472*** 0.472*** 0.473*** 0.472*** 0.471*** 0.471*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Hispanic (d) 0.184*** 0.187*** 0.185*** 0.187*** 0.183*** 0.187*** 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) 
Other Race (d) 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Year 2004 -0.065** -0.061* -0.062* -0.061* -0.067** -0.061* 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) 
Year 2008 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.006 -0.003 0.005 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.036) (0.042) 
Female-Male Ratio of 
District 
-0.423 -0.384 -0.414 -0.403 -0.424 -0.369 
(0.347) (0.349) (0.372) (0.373) (0.346) (0.346) 
Median Age of District 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ethnic Fragmentation 
of District 
-0.060 -0.047 -0.065 -0.051 -0.063 -0.036 
(0.173) (0.171) (0.186) (0.174) (0.176) (0.168) 
Population Density 
(1000s/sq. mi.) 
0.009  0.020  0.015  






0.019      






0.002 0.004**     
(0.003) (0.002)     
Mean Income/Median 
Income 
  0.060    
  (0.166)    
Mean Income/Median 
Income*Pop. Density 
  -0.001 0.013*   











    0.005  








    0.000 0.001** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
R-squared 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.213 
N 3082 3082 3082 3082 3082 3082 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note:  Each Regression uses the entire sample but a different measure of inequality.  Regressions (1) and 
(2) use poverty rate as the inequality measure, regressions (3) and (4) use median income divided by the 
10
th
 percentile of income, and regressions (5) and (6) use 90
th








Table 1.3:  NES (Congressional District) Marginal Effect of Probit Regression on Vote Choice 
0=Republican 1=Democrat 
(Std. Errors are presented in parenthesis and clustered by state for robustness) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Income in $10000s -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age 0.000 -0.002** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married Female (d) 0.054* 0.036 0.072* 
 (0.031) (0.062) (0.037) 
Single Female (d) 0.088*** 0.095*** 0.102*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.037) 
Married Male (d) -0.028 -0.092* 0.011 
 (0.033) (0.047) (0.044) 
Church Attendance (d) -0.067*** -0.052 -0.065*** 
 (0.019) (0.038) (0.019) 
Church Every Week (d) -0.245*** -0.240*** -0.230*** 
 (0.024) (0.067) (0.027) 
High School Dropout (d) 0.105*** 0.176*** 0.070* 
 (0.036) (0.051) (0.038) 
College Degree (d) 0.051** 0.034 0.063** 
 (0.024) (0.050) (0.030) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.137*** 0.112** 0.152*** 
 (0.025) (0.048) (0.028) 
Black (d) 0.472*** 0.351*** 0.536*** 
 (0.022) (0.028) (0.024) 
Hispanic (d) 0.184*** 0.133* 0.189*** 
 (0.045) (0.074) (0.057) 
Other Race (d) 0.181*** 0.161*** 0.182*** 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.058) 
Year 2004 -0.065** -0.146*** -0.027 
 (0.032) (0.046) (0.040) 
Year 2008 0.001 -0.057** 0.078* 
 (0.040) (0.028) (0.041) 
Female-Male Ratio of 
District 
-0.423 -0.449 -0.138 
(0.347) (0.352) (0.255) 
Median Age of District 0.004 0.005 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) 
Ethnic Fragmentation of 
District 
-0.060 0.156 -0.397** 
(0.173) (0.159) (0.166) 
Population Density 
(1000s/sq. mi.) 
0.009 0.005 -0.032 






0.019 0.041*** -0.017 






0.002 0.001 0.015** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.007) 
R-squared 0.213 0.187 0.239 
N 3082 892 2190 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note:  Each regression uses median income divided by 10
th




inequality.  Regressions (1) and (2) are of the full sample, Regressions (3) and (4) include only the heavily 
democratic coastal states which include:  ME, VT, MA, CT, RI, NY, NJ, MD, DE, CA, OR, WA, and HI, 





Table 1.4:  NES (Congressional District) Marginal Effect of Probit Regression on Vote Choice 
0=Republican 1=Democrat 
(Std. Errors are presented in parenthesis and clustered by state for robustness) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Income in $10000s -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.015* 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) 
Age 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married Female (d) 0.054* 0.044 0.066* 
 (0.031) (0.043) (0.036) 
Single Female (d) 0.088*** 0.112** 0.069** 
 (0.027) (0.044) (0.030) 
Married Male (d) -0.028 -0.048 0.004 
 (0.033) (0.049) (0.033) 
Church Attendance (d) -0.067*** -0.125*** -0.005 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.028) 
Church Every Week (d) -0.245*** -0.321*** -0.155*** 
 (0.024) (0.032) (0.031) 
High School Dropout (d) 0.105*** 0.079 0.092*** 
 (0.036) (0.071) (0.030) 
College Degree (d) 0.051** 0.070** 0.028 
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.033) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.137*** 0.169*** 0.074+ 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.045) 
Black (d) 0.472*** 0.527*** 0.414*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Hispanic (d) 0.184*** 0.178*** 0.175*** 
 (0.045) (0.055) (0.043) 
Other Race (d) 0.181*** 0.273*** 0.096 
 (0.037) (0.048) (0.068) 
Year 2004 -0.065** -0.059 -0.067+ 
 (0.032) (0.042) (0.044) 
Year 2008 0.001 0.012 -0.015 
 (0.040) (0.049) (0.039) 
Female-Male Ratio of 
District 
-0.423 -0.125 -0.924** 
(0.347) (0.262) (0.410) 
Median Age of District 0.004 -0.005 0.012** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Ethnic Fragmentation of 
District 
-0.060 -0.245 0.093 
(0.173) (0.207) (0.135) 
Population Density 
(1000s/sq. mi.) 
0.009 0.018 0.001 






0.019 0.024 0.009 






0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
R-squared 0.213 0.205 0.204 
N 3082 1599 1483 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note:  Each regression uses median income divided by 10
th




inequality.  Regression (1)  is of the full sample, Regression (2) is  of above median income earners in each 







Table 1.5:  List of Sample Means for each NES  regression (Std. Deviation are in Parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Vote Choice (d) 0.585 0.560 0.645 0.505 0.669 
 (0.493) (0.496) (0.479) (0.500) (0.471) 
Income in 10000s of 
dollars 
5.781 5.467 6.552 8.923 2.472 
(4.282) (4.121) (4.565) (3.742) (1.245) 
Age 48.339 48.314 48.401 46.383 50.400 
 (16.518) (16.573) (16.389) (13.814) (18.738) 
Married Female (d) 0.261 0.273 0.232 0.345 0.171 
 (0.439) (0.446) (0.422) (0.475) (0.377) 
Single Female (d) 0..298 0.308 0.275 0.166 0.440 
 (0.457) (0.462) (0.447) (0.373) (0.497) 
Married Male (d) 0.253 0.243 0.278 0.355 0.144 
 (0.435) (0.429) (0.448) (0.479) (0.351) 
Church Attendance (d) 0.434 0.425 0.456 0.455 0.412 
(0.496) (0.494) (0.498) (0.498) (0.492) 
Church Every Week 
(d) 
0.273 0.311 0.180 0.251 0.296 
(0.446) (0.463) (0.385) (0.434) (0.457) 
High School Dropout 
(d) 
0.075 0.080 0.062 0.021 0.132 
(0.263) (0.272) (0.241) (0.143) (0.339) 
College Degree (d) 0.213 0.205 0.232 0.287 0.135 
 (0.410) (0.404) (0.422) (0.453) (0.342) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.112 0.095 0.151 0.175 0.045 
(0.315) (0.294) (0.359) (0.380) (0.208) 
Black (d) 0.185 0.208 0.128 0.111 0.262 
 (0.388) (0.406) (0.334) (0.315) (0.440) 
Hispanic (d) 0.094 0.095 0.093 0.085 0.104 
 (0.292) (0.293) (0.291) (0.279) (0.305) 
Other Race (d) 0.066 0.052 0.100 0.068 0.063 
 (0.248) (0.221) (0.300) (0.252) (0.242) 
Female-Male Ratio 1.042 1.043 1.040 1.038 1.046 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.056) (0.044) 
Median Age 36.409 36.214 36.888 36.525 36.287 
 (3.099) (3.186) (2.820) (3.157) (3.033) 
Ethic Fragmentation 0.353 0.328 0.414 0.356 0.350 
(0.161) (0.154) (0.163) (0.163) (0.159) 
Population Density 
(1000s/sq. mi) 
1.867 0.959 4.097 1.961 1.769 
(5.085) (1.878) (8.588) (4.857) (5.315) 
Median Income/10th 
percentile income 
4.006 3.948 4.149 3.979 4.034 
(0.721) (0.656) (0.843) (0.746) (0.693) 
Mean/Median Income 1.323     








10.748     
(2.972) 
    
Obs. 3082 2190 892 1599 1483 
Note:  Column  (1) represents the summary statistics for the full sample, column (2) for all the states except 
the coastal states that are highly democratic of the west coast and northeast, column (3) for all the coastal 
states that are highly democratic which include:  ME, VT, MA, CT, RI, NY, NJ, MD, DE, DC, CA, OR, 
WA, and HI.  Column (4) is the sample mean and std. deviation for the top half of incomes where income 
is greater than or equal to $47,500 and column (5) is for the bottom half of reported incomes where income 
is less than $47,500.  All reported marginal effects in the paper come from using a one standard deviation 








Table 1.6:  NAES Survey (State Level)  Marginal Effects of Probit Regression on Vote Choice 0=Republican 1=Democrat 
(Std. Errors are presented in parenthesis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income in 10000s of 
dollars 
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married Female (d) -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Single Female (d) 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Married Male (d) -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.099*** -0.099*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Church Attendance (d) -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.122*** -0.122*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Church Every Week (d) -0.311*** -0.311*** -0.312*** -0.312*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
High School Dropout (d) 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
College Degree (d) 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Black (d) 0.494*** 0.494*** 0.494*** 0.494*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year 2000 (d) 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.029*** 0.041*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Year 2004 (d) 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Female-Male Ratio -1.660*** -1.627*** -1.277*** -1.534*** 
 (0.192) (0.189) (0.201) (0.187) 
Median Age 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ethic Fragmentation -0.000 -0.011 0.058 -0.011 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.042) (0.033) 
Population Density 
(1000s/sq. mi) 
-0.215**  -1.994***  
(0.107)  (0.519)  
Median Income/10th 
Percentile Income 
-0.006    





0.097*** 0.044***   
(0.027) (0.005)   
Mean Income/Median 
Income of State  
  -0.536***  




  1.610*** 0.121*** 
  (0.388) (0.014) 
R-squared 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.135 
N 26399 26399 26399 26399 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 




median income divided by the 10
th
 percentile of income as the inequality measure, regressions (3) and (4) use mean 








Table 1.7:  NAES Survey (State Level)  Marginal Effects of Probit Regression on Vote Choice 
0=Republican 1=Democrat 
(Std. Errors are presented in parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Income in 10000s of 
dollars 
-0.004*** -0.003** -0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 0.000* -0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married Female (d) -0.000 0.021 -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.013) 
Single Female (d) 0.114*** 0.127*** 0.105*** 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) 
Married Male (d) -0.098*** -0.075*** -0.106*** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) 
Church Attendance (d) -0.121*** -0.131*** -0.108*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) 
Church Every Week (d) -0.311*** -0.304*** -0.303*** 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) 
High School Dropout (d) 0.090*** 0.025 0.115*** 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.019) 
College Degree (d) 0.086*** 0.123*** 0.067*** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.204*** 0.224*** 0.189*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) 
Black (d) 0.494*** 0.390*** 0.542*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) 
Year 2000 (d) 0.041*** -0.106*** 0.031** 
 (0.011) (0.037) (0.013) 
Year 2004 (d) 0.034*** -0.048** 0.045*** 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.010) 
Female-Male Ratio -1.660*** 0.791+ -1.492*** 
 (0.192) (0.536) (0.250) 
Median Age 0.020*** -0.029** 0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) 
Ethic Fragmentation -0.000 -0.397*** -0.184*** 
 (0.033) (0.126) (0.046) 
Population Density 
(1000s/sq. mi) 
-0.215** 0.050 1.009** 





-0.006 0.012 0.027* 







0.097*** 0.002 -0.222* 
(0.027) (0.043) (0.125) 
R-squared 0.136 0.117 0.141 
N 26399 8099 18300 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note:  Each regression uses median income divided by 10
th
 percentile of income as the measure of 
inequality.  Regression (1) includes the full sample, Regression (2) includes only the heavily democratic 
coastal states which include:  ME, VT, MA, CT, RI, NY, NJ, MD, DE, CA, OR, WA, and HI, Regression 




Table 1.8:  NAES Survey (State Level)  Marginal Effects of Probit Regression on Vote Choice 
0=Republican 1=Democrat 
(Std. Errors are presented in parenthesis) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Income in 10000s of dollars -0.004*** -0.003** -0.010** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Age 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married Female (d) -0.000 0.004 -0.006 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) 
Single Female (d) 0.114*** 0.117*** 0.107*** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) 
Married Male (d) -0.098*** -0.105*** -0.080*** 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
Church Attendance (d) -0.121*** -0.140*** -0.098*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) 
Church Every Week (d) -0.311*** -0.321*** -0.297*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
High School Dropout (d) 0.090*** 0.021 0.094*** 
 (0.016) (0.033) (0.018) 
College Degree (d) 0.086*** 0.093*** 0.083*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.204*** 0.213*** 0.198*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) 
Black (d) 0.494*** 0.511*** 0.474*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) 
Year 2000 (d) 0.041*** -0.006 0.097*** 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) 
Year 2004 (d) 0.034*** 0.008 0.059*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
Female-Male Ratio -1.660*** -1.761*** -1.487*** 
 (0.192) (0.264) (0.279) 
Median Age 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ethic Fragmentation -0.000 -0.020 0.014 
 (0.033) (0.046) (0.048) 
Population Density 
(1000s/sq. mi) 
-0.215** -0.184 -0.214 
(0.107) (0.144) (0.160) 
Median Income/10th 
Percentile Income 
-0.006 -0.003 -0.006 




0.097*** 0.099*** 0.085** 
(0.027) (0.036) (0.041) 
R-squared 0.136 0.131 0.140 
N 26399 14149 12250 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note:  Each regression uses median income divided by 10
th
 percentile of income as the measure of 
inequality.  Regression (1) is the full sample, Regression (2) is income earners with above median income 






Table 1.9:  List of Sample Means for each NAES Survey  regressions (Std. Deviation are in Parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Vote Choice 0.513 0.477 0.596 0.496 0.534 
 (0.500) (0.499) (0.491) (0.500) (0.499) 
Income in 10000s of 
dollars 
6.568 6.252 7.290 9.537 2.959 
(4.418) (4.175) (4.851) (3.833) (1.283) 
Age 50.168 50.010 50.528 48.998 51.589 
 (15.000) (14.995) (15.006) (13.462) (16.569) 
Married Female (d) 0..320 0.332 0.291 0.385 0.244 
 (0.466) (0.471) (0.454) (0.487) (0.430) 
Single Female (d) 0.237 0.225 0.263 0.136 0.353 
(0.425) (0.418) (0.440) (0.343) (0.478) 
Married Male (d) 0.292 0.302 0.270 0.369 0.204 
 (0.455) (0.459) (0.444) (0.483) (0.403) 
Church Attendance 
(d) 
0.393 0.385 0.411 0.403 0.380 
(0.488) (0.487) (0.492) (0.491) (0.485) 
Church Every Week 
(d) 
0.366 0.401 0.284 0.358 0.376 
(0.482) (0.490) (0.451) (0.479) (0.484) 
High School 
Dropout (d) 
0.044 0.046 0.039 0.020 0.074 
(0.205) (0.210) (0.194) (0.138) (0.262) 
College Degree (d) 0.255 0.249 0.267 0.299 0.202 
(0.436) (0.433) (0.443) (0.458) (0.401) 
Advanced Degree 
(d) 
0.171 0.156 0.205 0.234 0.094 
(0.376) (0.363) (0.404) (0.423) (0.292) 
Black (d) 0.084 0.086 0.079 0.064 0.108 
 (0.278) (0.281) (0.270) (0.245) (0.311) 
Female-Male Ratio 1.031 1.031 1.032 1.031 1.031 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.030) (0.026) (0.024) 
Median Age 36.789 36.794 36.777 36.774 36.807 
 (2.028) (2.125) (1.789) (2.015) (2.044) 
Ethic Fragmentation 0.387 0.349 0.473 0.394 0.378 
(0.130) (0.112) (0.126) (0.130) (0.128) 
Population Density 
(1000s/sq. mi) 
0.230 0.152 0.405 0.249 0.208 




3.966 3.913 4.087 3.961 3.971 
(0.535) (0.547) (0.484) (0.526) (0.545) 
Obs. 26399 18300 8099 14149 12250 
Note:  Column  (1) represents the summary statistics for the full sample, column (2) for all the states except 
the coastal states that are highly democratic of the west coast and northeast, column (3) for all the coastal 
states that are highly democratic which include:  ME, VT, MA, CT, RI, NY, NJ, MD, DE, DC, CA, OR, 
WA, and HI.  Column (4) is the sample mean and std. deviation for above median income earners for the 
state and column (5) is for the below median income earners of the state.  All reported marginal effects in 








TEACHING A MAN TO FISH:  THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 
 OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 
I. Introduction 
The political geography of the United States in the past 20 years has been 
remarkably consistent in regard to national elections.  This pattern reveals the Democratic 
Party with strong support from the Northeast, upper Midwest, and West Coast, while the 
Republican Party controls the South and Great Plains.  While this pattern is insightful for 
predicting which party controls most areas of the country, it does not answer the question 
of what this political geography means for actual services provided by the public sector in 
those areas; redistributive services in particular.  This paper investigates the political 
geography of one such service:  elementary and secondary public education funding.  
Education is a unique publically provided good in that it provides a redistribution of 
resources across income groups (the rich help subsidize the poor’s education), between 
age groups (adults pay for children’s education), and between parents and non-parents 
(people without children subsidize the education of people with children).  This paper 
exploits the redistributive nature of public education to investigate the geographical 
aspects that influence the demand for public education as a proxy for the overall demand 
for redistribution in an area.   
The study of political geography is not simply identifying certain areas of the 
country that vote certain ways and providing certain public services, but what factors 




geographic characteristics in the motivations of voters, instead focusing only on 
individual characteristics of voters such as income, education, race, religious activities, 
etc.  However, when looking at just the individual characteristics of a person you ignore 
the potential impact of the environment an individual lives.  This refers to the interaction 
between social and economic classes and the impacts that has on demand for public 
education.  Income inequality is always the key variable for most redistribution-based 
political economy models dating back to Meltzer and Richards (1981). In their model, 
income inequality acts as a proxy for how many poor voters outnumber rich voters.  
Theoretically, areas where the income distribution is highly skewed, the median income 
earner, and thus the median voter has an income lower than the average income of an 
area. In such a situation if there is a common tax rate applied to all voters and a lump sum 
redistribution, any voter who has income less than average will have a net monetary 
benefit and thus be more favorable for redistribution as resources are extracted from the 
above average income earners.  These models ignore the impact that income inequality 
has on individual voters.  In particular, how the probability of interacting with other 
economic classes impacts preferences for public goods.  
For example, it could be the case that a high frequency of interaction between 
economic classes could make the wealthy more sympathetic to the needs of the poor and 
drive them to demand a greater provision of public education for the children of the area.  
On the other hand, repeated interactions could generate the opposite response and lead to 
the upper class more hostile to the idea of providing public education that will largely 




population density is high and where there is more interaction between economic classes 
than in rural areas.  National election results show these highly urbanized areas 
overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party, meaning that population density and 
income inequality together could explain variations in the demand for public education 
around the country, more so than simply using income inequality.  This suggests that in 
these areas it is simply the case that the poor vastly outnumber the rich.  Gelman et. Al 
(2007) has shown that while the poor do consistently vote Democrat, there are 
geographical variations among the rich that could be attributed to the environments the 
voters live.  This paper investigates that very question to see what impact this mixing of 
economic groups has for the provision of elementary and secondary public education in 
the nation.  The findings of this paper suggest that the environmental factors voters live 
are significant predictors of school funding.  These environmental factors include:  ethnic 
fragmentation, income inequality, population density, and the interaction between income 
inequality and population density.  As this interaction between income inequality and 
population density grows, there is less demand for local funding for public education.  In 
particular, a one standard deviation increase in population density increases the money 
per student from local sources by $379.  A one standard deviation in inequality will 
decrease funding per student from local sources by $174.   
II. Literature Review 
The literature for this issue spans two main areas:  What drives the demand for 
redistribution, and what drives the demand for public education.  Most political economy 




beginning with Meltzer and Richards (1981).  These models set forth that if there is 
substantial income inequality in a region, the median voter will have below average 
income and therefore will be a net beneficiary or redistributive policies of the 
government. Empirically, there is mixed evidence on the correlation of income inequality 
and the level of redistribution.  Boustan et al. (2010) show evidence consistent with 
Meltzer and Richards, showing areas with high levels of income inequality are associated 
with an expansion in revenues and expenditures on a wide range of services at the 
municipal and school district levels.  Additionally, Cascio and Washington (2012) and 
Husted et al (1997) detail how expansion of voting rights through the voting rights act of 
1965 and the repeal of poll taxes increased the number of low income individuals who 
were able to vote.  As a result, the size of government and level of redistribution grew in 
areas where these policies had the largest impact.  Rodden (2010) also details a large 
reason why dense urban areas favor more redistribution than other parts of the nation 
comes as a direct result from the large concentration of low income individuals in cities. 
There is also considerable evidence suggesting there is not a strong correlation 
between income inequality and the level of redistribution we would expect in the United 
States given what we see in other countries around the world with similar levels of 
income inequality (Gelman et al. 2010, Dion 2010, and Borck 2007). Inequality coupled 
with voter turnout is the real predictor.  Models such as Meltzer and Richard inaccurately 
assume that everyone votes.  Since poor individuals are less likely to vote than the more 




are voters who would be casting their vote for more redistribution but their choice to 
abstain diminishes the amount of redistribution demanded from elections. 
Inequality is not the only factor in deriving the demand for redistribution.  Alesina 
et al (1999) describes how the ethnic make-up of an area is also a significant determinant 
of the demand for public goods in an area.  They detail the empirical evidence suggesting 
that areas with a high level of ethnic fragmentation (many different ethnic groups living 
together) there is less demand for local government services as the redistribution tends to 
cross ethnic lines.   
Most political economy models make the assumption that the poor favor 
redistribution and the rich oppose it, but voting data shows that income is not a great 
predictor of how much someone favors redistribution.  Gelman et. al. (2007) detail that in 
the urban areas of the nation income does not have much correlation at all with voter 
preference where in rural areas income is a very strong predictor, better fitting into the 
mold of normal political economy models.  This suggests that the environment a voter 
lives in also plays just as important a role as their income.  While a rich individual may 
bear a larger cost of redistribution, if they live in an area of high inequality, though they 
do not get the monetary benefit of receiving redistribution, they get the social benefit of 
having some of the problems associated with income inequality alleviated in their area.  
This builds on the theory put forward by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) suggesting this 
is the reason we see similar social services in countries around the world even if one is 
ruled by democracy and others ruled by dictatorships.  This line of research drives the 




population density of that area, impact the demand for public education, not just simply 
income inequality as suggested by past research. 
Education has some redistributive properties; however there are aspects of society 
that drive the demand for access to public education that isn’t explained by a desire for 
redistribution.  The main reason is people from all incomes potentially benefit from 
education, whether a household has children or grandchildren that will attend the schools 
in question, or they receive the benefits of have a well-educated community, the amount 
of income someone earns doesn’t necessarily impact their preferences.  Income inequality 
is certainly a factor, mainly stemming from the fact that there are private options for 
education available. It is more often the wealthier families who choose this option, 
leading low income earners to likely have only the public option available.  Arcalean and 
Schiopu (2012) indeed show that high levels of inequality in an area where there is access 
to a private schooling option leads to lower funding per student as the rich oppose 
funding public education since their children will not benefit.  Epple and Romano (1996) 
coined the term “ends against the middle” to describe how the presence of a private 
option leads to the rich and the poor to both oppose public education spending and only 
the middle class to support it since their children will both choose the public option and 
have the ability to pay the higher taxes.  This is one of the few models where the median 
income earner is not the decisive voter.  While Epple and Romano’s empirical evidence 
suggests such a coalition, Cohen-Zada and Justman (2003) also have evidence to show 
such a coalition does not exist, but rather that the median voter is decisive.  This evidence 




voter models that higher income inequality is associated with more local spending on 
public education.  De La Criox and Doepke (2009) develop a theory claiming as private 
school enrollment increases, funding per student actually increases since there are fewer 
students enrolled.  This only occurs if the politicians of the area are more responsive to 
low income families.  This line of research shows the need to control for how many 
children attend private schools in an area when estimating the demand for education 
funding. 
Education funding is also unique in that the funds for education come from many 
different sources.  A single school can receive funds from the local taxes, state taxes, 
federal taxes, and contributions from local parent organizations.  In developing a political 
economy model focusing on the local demand for education funding, it is important to 
account for what drives the other sources of funding in order to isolate the local demand.  
For this paper, the main issue is controlling for how much money the state is going to 
provide verses how much the local government will provide.  The presence of state funds 
blurs the line of how much education funding is actually determined on the local level.  
According to classic Tiebout (1956) sorting, there is expected to be wide level of 
variation among the services offered by governments as citizens self-select themselves 
into jurisdictions that best match their preferences for funds.  This suggests that there 
should be substantial levels of inequality in school spending both between and within 
states due to heterogeneity of voter preferences.  However, beginning in the 1970s there 
has been a wave of court cases and legislation that has deemed such inequality within 




important to control for the presence of court cases, constitutional language, and 
legislation in a state that serves to equalize education funding across districts.  Figlio et al 
(2007) found that these instances significantly affect the degree of school spending 
equality within a state.  In such situations, the desired funding level of the local 
community could be overridden by the views of the state as a whole.  Card and Payne 
(2002) have shown that as the movement toward spending equality across school districts 
within a state has become common practice there has also been a narrowing of the gap in 
test scores across districts which seems to further drive demand from state voters to have 
more equity in statewide education spending. 
The determination of state aid to school districts has also been the subject of much 
research.  As stated earlier a large factor is court cases, but while inequality on the local 
level impacts education funding, it also matters on the state level.  De Bartolome (1997) 
has found that from 1970 to 1990 between 32% and 66% of the increase in school aid 
from the state has been caused by changes in the distribution of income within the state.  
He also found that 18% is caused by court cases described above.  This means when 
estimating demand for local and state spending on education it is important to control for 
both local levels of inequality (county levels) as well as state levels of inequality. 
 
III. Empirical Model 
The purpose of this paper is to look at the political geography of public education 
funding as a proxy for redistribution demanded by local communities.  To do this, we 




There are four key sources for education funds:  the Federal Government, the State 
Government, the Local Government, and contributions from parent organizations (PTO).  
This paper ignores revenue from the Federal government as money from the Federal 
government is a small percentage of total funding, does not vary much between states, 
and is usually earmarked for specific programs. 
Money from the State government, though it represents redistribution from rich 
areas of the state to poor areas of the state, is not the exact form of redistribution this 
paper seeks to identify.  The focus of this paper is the level of redistribution within a local 
jurisdiction.  Because of this, the main dependent variable of the regressions will be the 
revenue per student raised from local taxation.  Revenue raised from parent organizations 
also serves as local revenue going into local schools however the focus of this paper is 
the determination of public funding of schools.  Therefore voluntary contributions to 
schools will be treated as a completely separate source of revenue. 
The complexity of estimating the demand for local government spending on 
education is that when voting for the quality of education their student receives, a voter 
cares about the total sum, whether that comes from state, local, or parental sources.  A 
dollar that is received from the state is just as good as a dollar received from local 
revenue, with the exception that the cost of a dollar from the state is less to the local tax 
base, as it assumed that dollar came from another area of the state.  To model the decision 
of the voter, we will treat the choice for funding as a simultaneous equation, where the 
local government, the state government and the parent organizations simultaneously 




 Let E represent the total amount of spending per student for each county in the 
nation.  L represents the per student revenue from local tax sources, S represents per 
student revenue from state tax sources, and P represents per student revenue from parent 
organizations.  We assume that the revenue per student of parent organizations is given, 
but all decisions are made simultaneously.   X represents a vector of variables that impact 
the demand for local revenue, which includes geographic variables and Y is a vector of 
variables the impact the demand for state revenues.  These variables will be explained 
explicitly in the data and results section.  Let, 
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Which implies, 
     (     )                                                      ( ) 
   
        (    )                   
    (    )
                    (5) 
And 
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               (7) 
 Since the error terms of equations (5) and (7) will be correlated, the assumptions of OLS 
will be violated.  To estimate this equation, we will use a 3 stage least-squares regression 




endogenous variable (S and P) in the first stage, which will give us a consistent estimate 
of the covariance matrix of the equation disturbances in the second stage.  Finally, the 
third stage will be using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation using the 
covariance matrix in the second stage with the instrumented values in place of the right-




The data for this paper comes from the US Census data on Public Elementary-
Secondary Education Finance Data from the school year 2000-2001.  The data covers 
each school district in the United States.  The data includes total revenue from all sources 
of government, local, state, and federal.  In particular, on the local level, there is data on 
how much money came from local taxes and how much money came from parent 
organizations.  Additionally, the data contains school enrollment for each district which 
allows for converting all revenue raised into per student values.  The data contains 
information on expenditures, breaking down exactly what each school district spends 
their money on.  For the purposed of this paper, only revenues raised from local and state 
sources are utilized.   
To determine the political geography of education funding, education data must 
be match with the demographics of each area.  Since the smallest unit of geography that 
has reliable demographic data available is the county, each school district is aggregated 




districts in a single county, total funding to each school district is added up along with 
total enrollment creating a measure of how much each county spends on public 
education.  This county schooling data is then matched with various demographic 
variables of the county and state from the 2000 US Census.   
The demographic variables of interest that impact education preference include 
median county income, percent of the population in normal parenting age (age 21-40), 
education attainment of the county, church attendance of the county, ethnic fragmentation 
of the county (probability that two randomly drawn individuals are of different ethnicity), 
percent of the county enrolled in private schools, percent of the county who are of 
elementary and secondary school age (percent under age 18), relative county income 
(county income divided by the income of the state’s median county), state-wide 
inequality (mean county income divided by the median county income), counties per  
1000 people, and most importantly for this paper, data on county level inequality, 
measured by mean income divided my median income, and population density of each 
county, measured by 1000s of people per square mile. 
An important aspect of this regression is choosing which variables impact the 
demand for locally generated revenue and which variables impact the demand for more 
state generated revenue. Of the variables listed above,   it is assumed that all of the 
county specific variables impact the demand for locally generated revenue, where the 
state specific variables determine the demand for state generated revenue.  In particular, 
relative county income is a measure of how a county’s income compares with the rest of 




nation, yet poor compared to other counties in the state, which would inducing  more 
funds from the state government to help equate spending.  Statewide inequality is used as 
a measure to see how skewed income is across the state.  States that have a high degree of 
inequality between counties could see more state funds utilized to smooth out the 
inequalities in resources available to students.  Finally counties per 1000 people is a 
measure of the options individuals within a state.  According to Tiebout sorting, the more 
counties there are in a state per person the more opportunities there are for an individual 
to find a community that best fits their desire for public education.  We’d expect the more 
counties per person the less spending from the state since individuals can choose a 
location closer to their optimal level of public education provided. 
Some variation in spending patterns across states can be explained by 
constitutional requirements or court cases that have challenged existing spending 
policies.  For example, some states have requirements that spending be more or less 
equitable across counties, so if a county happens to have a lower income, thus smaller tax 
base, than most of the other counties in the state then that county would expect to receive 
more state funding to supplement their students.  To account for this, constitutional 
requirement variables were constructed and a dummy for if a state had a successful court 
challenge to their education funding policy.  The constitutional variables are constructed 
based on language in the state constitution that refers to the equity of school funding 
across the state, as well as the adequacy of school funding across the state.  These 
variables were constructed by Figlio et al (2002) and include dummy variables for states 




Additionally dummy variables for states that require a high level of school funding (high 
adequacy) and states that require a middle level of school funding (middle adequacy) are 
created, also from Figlio et. Al. (2002).  A list of which states fall into each of these 
categories, and states that have had successful court challenges can be found in the 
appendix. 
V. Results 
 In terms of results, its first interesting to compare how state level political 
geography lines up with local public education spending patterns.  The Democratic Party 
is a larger advocate for public education compared to the Republican Party, whose 
education platform always includes private school vouchers.  Because of this, it is 
interesting to see how counties in Democratic states spend money on education compared 
to counties in Republican states.  Whether a state is Republican or Democrat is calculated 
using presidential election returns from the 2000 Presidential election.  It’s also 
interesting to compare counties that voted Democratic in the 2000 election to counties 
that voted Republican, as this gives a better idea of how the local area leans politically.  
Table 2.1 reports the results for the sample means of each variable included in the 
education funding data set.  The first two columns represent Democratic counties versus 
Republican counties where the last two columns represent counties in Democratic states 
versus counties in Republican states.  If the entry is bold, then the average value of the 
variable in Democratic counties or counties in Democratic states are statistically larger 




Democratic voting counties have a statistically higher total spending per student 
and higher spending per student coming from state government and parent sources.  
However, Republican counties have more revenue per student coming from local 
government sources.  The percent funding from the state is not statistically significant 
between the two types of counties, but Republican counties have a larger percentage of 
their funds coming from local government sources.  Looking at how Democratic and 
Republican States differ, counties in Democratic states have statistically higher per 
student spending total spending, state revenue, local revenue, and revenue from parental 
sources.  Counties in Republican states however, get a larger percentage of their funds 
from the state government, where the counties in Democratic states get a larger portion of 
their funds from local governments. 
 Table 2.2 present the regression results where the dependent variable is total 
spending per student from all sources.  It is useful to compare how demographics affect 
spending from all sources and then compare how they affect amount of local spending 
per student.   Regressions were run based on the same categories presented in table 1, 
with all counties, just Democratic counties, just Republican counties, counties in 
Democratic states, and counties in Republican states.  Looking at the regression including 
all counties the only significant variables are median income of the county, which has a 
positive impact on education spending.  Percent of the population that is age 21-40 
(normal parental age) has a negative impact on education funding, where the larger the 
percentage of the county that has at least a bachelor’s degree increases the amount of 




of a given state receive more funding per student.  State inequality is positive and 
significant suggesting that the larger the skewness of county incomes within a state 
increases total funding per student.   
Finally the environmental variables of interest for this paper suggests a 
contradiction to normal median voter models, counties with higher levels of income 
inequality, measured by the ratio of mean to median income, actually receive less funding 
per student, which is interestingly enough the opposite of statewide inequality, while 
more densely populated areas receive more funding per student.  The interaction of 
density and inequality captures the affect that proximity to inequality has on voting.  For 
all counties, as proximity to inequality increases or as inequality increases for a given 
level of interaction between classes, there is a negative impact on funding per student.  
This suggests the if education funding is a way to measure redistribution, the more 
interaction an individual has with unequal income distributions, or the greater inequality 
for a given interaction level, the less amount of spending per student.  In particular, a one 
standard deviation increase in population density (using summary statistics presented in 
Table 2.3), the funds per student will increase by $334 per student, while a one standard 
deviation increase in income inequality decreases funding by $268 per student.  Ideally, 
we would be able to isolate the views of the upper income earners as the theory presented 
in chapter one suggests the interaction between social classed only affects the upper 





Isolating Democratic and Republican counties and counties in Democratic and 
Republican states yield similar results.  The only regression that yields substantial 
degrees of difference from the regression including all counties is the regression using 
only counties in Democratic states.  In these counties, ethnic fragmentation, middle 
equity, Supreme Court case, and counties per person each have positive significant 
effects on funding, while Percent under the age of 18 and high adequacy, generate a 
significant negative impact on funding per student.  
Table 2.4 presents the main results of the paper, estimating equation number 5 
from the empirical model section.  In order to measure how demographics impact the 
level of local redistribution, the amount of funding coming from the local level must be 
isolated.  If spending per student is high in an area but the bulk is coming from the state 
government, there is still redistribution at work, but it is coming from outside the 
community, so measuring the proximity of inequality within a county would have no 
impact on that form of redistribution.  The regressions are broken up the same way as in 
table 2.2, with all counties in the sample, counties that voted Democratic, counties that 
voted Republican, counties in Democratic states, and finally, counties in Republican 
states, to see if the coefficients on the variables are consistent across the subsamples.  As 
explained in the empirical section each regression is three-stage lease squares, the first 
stage regressions for state revenue per student can be found in the appendix. 
The regression including all counties has some interesting results.  First, state 
funding per student doesn’t have a significant impact on local funding but parent funding 




local funding they demand.  Somewhat interesting is as the percentage of the county that 
is of parenting age increases there is less demand for local revenue.  The more educated a 
county is in terms of percent obtaining at least a bachelor’s degree has a significant 
positive impact on local funding.  As the percent of the county enrolled in private school 
increases, the demand for local funds for public education fall which makes sense since a 
parent who pays to send their child to a private school no longer has a desire to pay for a 
school their child isn’t attending.  Similar to the regression on total spending per student 
the county inequality, population density, and density-inequality interaction have the 
same signs, yet all three are significant at the 99% level, showing that these 
demographics do have a strong impact on the demand for local expenditure on public 
education.  Additionally, the ethnic fragmentation of a county has a significant negative 
impact on local revenues, which is predicted by Alesina et al. (1999). 
In particular, as inequality within a county grows there will be less funding per 
student from local sources.  As population density increases, funding per student 
increases, though as the interaction of population density and income inequality grow, 
there is less funding per student from local sources.  Again, the interaction term captures 
the level of interaction between income groups in a county, the larger this number is the 
more interactions between income groups you can expect in an area.  As this interaction 
grows, there is less demand for local funding for public education.  In particular, a one 
standard deviation increase in population density increases the money per student from 
local sources by $379.  A one standard deviation in inequality will decrease funding per 




with total funding it seems that most of the impact in funding coming from changes in 
local inequality and population density impacts local funding rather than state funding.  
With local funding actually increasing more than total funding when population density 
increases.  What this does illustrate is the significant these environmental factors have on 
local policy preferences.  Only once we consider the affect a person’s environment has on 
their preferences will we truly be able to understand why the political geography of the 
nation is the way it is. 
The other regressions divided by how the county and state voted in the 2000 
Presidential election show similar results.  For Democratic counties the only key 
difference is population density and the interaction between inequality and population 
density are no longer significant.  Looking just at Republican counties gives similar 
results to including all counties with the exception that percent of the population under 
age 18 becomes significant at the 99% level.  Isolating only counties in states that voted 
Democrat, we see that state funding per student becomes a significant predictor or local 
funding per student, suggesting as state funding per student increases, so does local 
funding per student.  Additionally, church attendance becomes significant at the 99% 
level and much higher in magnitude than the coefficients on the other regressions.  As 
with Democratic counties, population density and the interaction between population 
density and income inequality are not significant.  However, income inequality switches 
signs and becomes positive and significant for counties in democratic states.  Finally, for 




density and the interaction between income inequality and population density are not 
significant predictors of local funding per student. 
Finally, table 2.6 represents the counties broken up by how many counties are in 
each state.  States that only have a few counties could have different spending patterns 
than states with a large number of counties such as Texas, Georgia or Virginia.  This 
table sees if this is the case.  The first regression is the same as column 1 from table 2.3, 
reprinted for reference.  The second column contains counties in states that have more 
than 88 counties, where the third column is for counties in states that have less than 88 
counties.  The cutoff of 88 counties was chosen because it best cut the sample of counties 
in half. In terms of differences between the two regressions, the impact of state spending 
on local spending is slightly higher for counties in states with more than 88 counties, 
though both coefficients are negative and significant at the 99% level, but not significant 
at all in the full sample.  Ethnic fragmentation actually has a positive and significant 
relationship in the large number of counties regression, and population density and the 
interaction between population density and income inequality are not significant.  For 
counties in states with fewer than 88 counties, the only real deviation from the full 
sample is that parent revenue per student has a positive and significant impact on local 
spending per student, suggesting that for states with fewer counties parent spending and 
local spending could potentially be complementary.   
VI. Conclusion 
The political geography of public education is important because it allows us to 




paper has shown is that aside from the individual characteristics of voters such as their 
income, education, choice to have children, which all impact their preferences for 
education there are environmental factors that also play a very significant role.  Income 
inequality is a good proxy for measuring how low income individuals outnumber the high 
income, and population density is a good measure to explain that cities will have more 
funding because cities are more expensive due to higher property values,   the interaction 
between these two variable captures what impact the proximity of inequality has on 
education funding.  What these results show is that as the interaction between income 
groups increases, or income inequality increases for a given degree of interaction, an area 
experiences less demand for education from the local level and total funding.  This could 
potentially suggest that as opposed to interactions increasing sympathy for lower classed 
inducing more spending, the opposite is actually true.  The aggregation of the data to 
county level does make it difficult to truly observe the impact proximity of inequality has 
on individual voter preferences.  However, these results do show that the impact is a 
significant one and one worthy of devoting further research as we seek to understand how 






Table 2.1:  Sample means from counties by 2000 Presidential Election Vote 
Note:  Std. Errors Reported in Parenthesis 
** denotes significance at 99%, * at 98% and + at 90% 
Bold entries signify Democratic values are statistically larger than Republican 












7.758149 8.230*** 7.657*** 9.116*** 7.499*** 
(2.026) (2.502) (1.894) (2.120) (1.901) 
State Revenue 
per Student 
4.108026 4.330*** 4.060*** 4.667*** 4.001*** 
(1.247) (1.283) (1.234) (1.518) (1.159) 
Local Revenue 
per Student 
2.721944 2.478*** 2.773*** 3.338*** 2.604*** 
(2.113) (2.507) (2.016) (1.957) (2.122) 
Parent Revenue 
per Student 
0.3130368 0.630*** 0.2453*** 0.5112*** 0.2752*** 
(1.016) (1.607) (0.8233) (1.488) (0.8949) 
Percent State 
Funding 
0.5425 0.5468 0.5416 0.5201** 0.5468** 
(0.141) (0.143) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) 
State funding 
from Formula 
0.4099 0.4021 0.4116 0.3543** 0.4205** 
(0.138) (0.146) (0.136) (0.145) (0.134) 
State Special Ed 
Funding 
0.0203 0.0201 0.0204 0.0372** 0.0171** 




0.0097 0.0091 0.0099 0.0196** 0.0079** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014) 
Other State 
Funding 
0.1024 0.1153** 0.0996** 0.1087** 0.1012** 
(0.072) (0.077) (0.070) (0.059) (0.074) 
Percent Local 
Funding 
0.3763 0.3537** 0.3811** 0.4139** 0.3691** 
(0.157) (0.166) (0.154) (0.154) (0.156) 
Local funding 
from taxes 
0.2479 0.1995** 0.2582** 0.2672** 0.2442** 




0.2350 0.1883** 0.2450** 0.2561** 0.2310** 




0.0396 0.0702** 0.0330** 0.0529* 0.0370* 
(0.116) (0.157) (0.105) (0.150) (0.109) 
Local funding 
from cities and 
county 
0.0121 0.0121 0.0122 0.0075** 0.0130** 




0.0117 0.0135 0.0114 0.0302** 0.0082** 
(0.029) (0.032) (0.028) (0.054) (0.019) 
Local funding 
from charges 
0.0312 0.0244** 0.0327** 0.0211** 0.0331** 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.009) (0.019) 
Other Local 
funding 
0.0334 0.0338 0.0334 0.0348 0.0332 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.020) (0.026) 








Table 2.2:  OLS Regression on Total Spending for Student ($1000s of dollars) for Each County for the year 2000 
(Std. Errors are presented in Parentheses and Clustered by state for robustness) 













(10000s of dollars) 
1.243*** 0.885** 1.325*** 0.844*** 0.732+ 
(0.306) (0.402) (0.330) (0.239) (0.466) 
Percent Age 21-40 -0.056** -0.073 -0.060*** -0.023 -0.059** 
(0.021) (0.052) (0.022) (0.039) (0.022) 
Percent HS Dropout -0.017 0.003 -0.028* -0.034 0.002 
(0.020) (0.037) (0.016) (0.050) (0.015) 
Percent with a 
Bachelor’s Degree 
0.078*** 0.128*** 0.062*** 0.001 0.070** 
(0.024) (0.044) (0.020) (0.016) (0.026) 
Percent that attends 
Church 
-0.200 0.365 -0.251 1.484 -0.336 
(0.351) (0.857) (0.381) (1.040) (0.373) 
Ethnic Fragmentation -0.536 -0.463 -0.584 1.781** -0.165 
(0.519) (1.035) (0.532) (0.746) (0.529) 
Percent under age 18 0.016 0.038 -0.002 -0.118+ 0.011 
(0.037) (0.061) (0.038) (0.067) (0.040) 
Percent in Private 
School 
-0.063 -0.091 -0.074 0.079 -0.094+ 
(0.055) (0.093) (0.053) (0.121) (0.056) 
County Income 
Relative to State’s 
Median County 
-6.543*** -6.597*** -6.313*** -3.470** -4.123*** 




6.685+ 6.138 7.022* 17.493*** -2.162 
(4.028) (5.359) (3.547) (1.979) (3.962) 
Strong Equity 0.315 0.249 0.282 0.000 0.081 
(0.272) (0.344) (0.256) (0.000) (0.214) 
Middle Equity 0.261 -0.114 0.345 1.070*** 0.384 
(0.281) (0.471) (0.278) (0.260) (0.274) 
High Adequacy -0.222 0.119 -0.275 -1.573*** 0.213 
(0.236) (0.391) (0.225) (0.177) (0.189) 
Medium Adequacy 0.302 0.843** 0.183 0.515+ 0.350 
(0.266) (0.369) (0.254) (0.305) (0.264) 
Supreme Ct. case 0.181 -0.082 0.275 0.888*** 0.452** 
(0.257) (0.377) (0.246) (0.244) (0.210) 
Counties per 1000s 
people 
3.833 10.004 4.514 312.553*** -3.321 




-2.112* -4.195+ -1.910** 0.483 -1.444 
(1.076) (2.772) (0.726) (1.334) (1.165) 
Population Density 
(1000s of People) 
0.698** -0.163 0.869** -0.003 0.480 
(0.303) (0.767) (0.410) (0.283) (0.656) 
Population 
Density*Inequality 
-0.332** 0.204 -0.415* -0.022 -0.071 
(0.154) (0.532) (0.208) (0.146) (0.486) 
Constant 5.440 9.157 5.307 -13.383*** 15.289*** 
(4.666) (7.196) (4.301) (3.944) (4.171) 
R-squared 0.231 0.279 0.216 0.412 0.187 
N 3093 544 2549 495 2598 




Table 2.3:  Sample Means and Sample Standard Deviations for Regressions reported in Table 2.2 









Total Funding Per 
Student 
7.758 8.230 7.657 9.116 7.499 
(2.026) (2.502) (1.894) (2.120) (1.901) 
Median County 
Income 
(10000s of dollars) 
3.524 3.434 3.543 4.101 3.414 
(.878) (1.068) (.831) (1.005) (.806) 
Percent Age 21-40 47.038 48.277 46.773 48.186 46.819 
(4.300) (4.024) (4.3116) (3.556) (4.394) 
Percent HS Dropout 22.655 25.540 22.040 18.291 23.487 
(8.717) (10.786) (8.078) (5.614) (8.952) 
Percent with a 
Bachelor’s Degree 
16.493 17.554 16.267 19.857 15.852 
(7.770) (10.316) (7.091) (9.036) (7.333) 
Percent that attends 
Church 
.532 .495 .539 .470 .543 
(.184) (.173) (.185) (.139) (.189) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
.218 .309 .199 .198 .221 
(.172) (.191) (.162) (.164) (.173) 
Percent under age 18 25.491 25.478 25.491 24.705 25.641 
(3.177) (3.688) (3.057) (2.752) (3.230) 
Percent in Private 
School 
2.381 2.784 2.294 2.988 2.265 
(1.454) (1.599) (1.407) (1.524) (1.411) 
County Income 
Relative to State’s 
Median County 
1.037 .979 1.049 1.042 1.036 




1.305 1.323 1.301 1.337 1.299 
(.059) (.063) (.058) (.066) (.056) 
Strong Equity .082 .093 .079  .097 
(.274) (.292) (.270)  (.296) 
Middle Equity .299 .183 .324 .078 .341 
(.458) (.387) (.468) (.269) (.474) 
High Adequacy .126 .131 .126 .284 .096 
(.332) (.337) (.331) (.451) (.295) 
Medium Adequacy .345 .294 .357 .236 .366 
(.475) (.456) (.479) (.425) (.482) 
Supreme Ct. case .328 .366 .321 .311 .332 
(.469) (.482) (.466) (.463) (.470) 
Counties per 1000s 
people 
.0216 .016 .023 .006 .024 




1.268 1.342 1.253 1.243 1.273 
(.123) (.152) (.109) (.085) (.128) 
Population Density 
(1000s of People) 
.208 .496 .147 .570 .139 
(1.207) (1.437) (1.143) (2.811) (.449) 
Population 
Density*Inequality 
.284 .675 .201 .841 .178 
(2.164) (2.062) (2.177) (5.214) (.581) 





Table 2.4:  Three-Stage Regression on Local Government Revenue per Student (1000s of dollars) for each 
county for year 2000 
(Std. Errors are presented in Parentheses) 











Local Gov. Revenue per 
Student      
State Government 
Revenue per Student 
0.066 -0.201 0.005 0.237*** -0.138* 
(0.071) (0.190) (0.076) (0.089) (0.081) 
Parent Revenue per 
Student 
-0.886*** -0.652*** -1.260*** -1.006*** -0.983*** 
(0.090) (0.146) (0.107) (0.080) (0.089) 
Median County Income 
(10000s of dollars) 
0.468*** 0.310+ 0.526*** 1.072*** 0.258*** 
(0.071) (0.194) (0.076) (0.150) (0.084) 
Percent Age 21-40 -0.062*** -0.099*** -0.066*** -0.108*** -0.070*** 
(0.010) (0.031) (0.010) (0.028) (0.012) 
Percent HS Dropout 0.003 0.038* 0.000 0.050** 0.008 
(0.008) (0.020) (0.008) (0.023) (0.008) 
Percent with a 
Bachelor’s Degree 
0.070*** 0.109*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.081*** 
(0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009) 
Percent that attends 
Church 
0.239 0.380 0.053 2.655*** -0.022 
(0.186) (0.556) (0.205) (0.543) (0.219) 
Ethnic Fragmentation -1.080*** -1.205** -0.956*** -1.060+ -0.963*** 
(0.223) (0.549) (0.250) (0.696) (0.257) 
Percent under age 18 -0.025** -0.050+ -0.044*** -0.262*** -0.012 
(0.013) (0.031) (0.014) (0.036) (0.014) 
Percent in Private 
School 
-0.080*** -0.030 -0.095*** 0.202*** -0.127*** 




-1.338*** -2.974*** -1.509*** 2.336** -1.975*** 
(0.364) (0.884) (0.422) (1.188) (0.435) 
Population Density 
(1000s of People) 
0.803*** -0.798 1.436*** -0.053 -0.747 
(0.193) (0.840) (0.295) (0.229) (1.018) 
Population 
Density*Inequality 
-0.385*** 0.611 -0.693*** -0.008 0.908 
(0.103) (0.573) (0.151) (0.119) (0.773) 
Constant 5.350*** 10.082*** 6.622*** 3.508+ 7.607*** 
(0.778) (2.539) (0.893) (2.234) (0.939) 
R-squared 0.235 0.325 0.238 0.435 0.281 
N 3093 544 2549 495 2598 





Table 2.5:  Sample Means and Sample Standard Deviations for Regressions in Table 2.4 














2.722 2.479 2.774 3.338 2.605 




3.944 4.157 3.899 4.331 3.871 
(1.211) (1.248) (1.198) (1.452) (1.145) 
Parent Revenue per 
Student 
0.313 0.630 0.245 0.511 0.275 
(1.017) (1.608) (0.823) (1.488) (0.895) 
Median County 
Income 
(10000s of dollars) 
3.525 3.434 3.544 4.101 3.415 
(0.878) (1.068) (0.831) (1.006) (0.807) 
 
Percent Age 21-40 
47.038 48.278 46.774 48.186 46.820 
(4.300) (4.024) (4.312) (3.556) (4.394) 
 
Percent HS Dropout 
22.656 25.540 22.040 18.291 23.488 
(8.717) (10.786) (8.079) (5.615) (8.953) 
Percent with a 
Bachelor’s Degree 
16.494 17.555 16.267 19.858 15.853 
(7.770) (10.317) (7.092) (9.037) (7.333) 
Percent that attends 
Church 
0.532 0.495 0.540 0.470 0.544 
(0.184) (0.173) (0.185) (0.139) (0.189) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
0.218 0.309 0.199 0.199 0.222 
(0.172) (0.191) (0.162) (0.165) (0.173) 
Percent under age 
18 
25.491 25.478 25.494 24.705 25.641 
(3.177) (3.689) (3.058) (2.752) (3.231) 
Percent in Private 
School 
2.381 2.784 2.295 2.988 2.265 




1.269 1.342 1.253 1.243 1.274 
(0.123) (0.152) (0.110) (0.086) (0.129) 
Population 
Density 
(1000s of People) 
0.208 0.496 0.147 0.571 0.139 
(1.207) (1.437) (1.143) (2.812) (0.450) 
Population 
Density*Inequality 
0.284 0.675 0.201 0.842 0.178 
(2.165) (2.063) (2.178) (5.215) (0.581) 







Table 2.6:  Three-Stage Regression on Local Government Revenue per Student (1000s of dollars) for each 
county for year 2000 
(Std. Errors are presented in Parentheses) 
Variable All Counties 
Counties in States with 
greater than 88 counties 
Counties in States with 
Less than 88 Counties 
Local Gov. Revenue per 
Student 
   
State Government Revenue 
per Student 
0.066 -0.791*** -0.229*** 
(0.071) (0.117) (0.061) 
Parent Revenue per 
Student -0.886*** -1.180*** 0.492*** 
 (0.090) (0.107) (0.108) 
Median County Income 
(10000s of dollars) 
0.468*** -0.041 0.105 
(0.071) (0.128) (0.080) 
Percent Age 21-40 -0.062*** -0.107*** 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.011) 
Percent HS Dropout 0.003 0.012 -0.032*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) 
Percent with a Bachelor’s 
Degree 
0.070*** 0.096*** 0.009 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.009) 
Percent that attends Church 0.239 0.420 -0.055 
 (0.186) (0.352) (0.208) 
Ethnic Fragmentation -1.080*** 0.623+ -2.270*** 
 (0.223) (0.381) (0.293) 
Percent under age 18 -0.025** 0.029 -0.032** 
 (0.013) (0.027) (0.013) 
Percent in Private School -0.080*** -0.139*** 0.016 
 (0.025) (0.045) (0.030) 
County Inequality 
(Mean/Median income) 
-1.338*** -2.057*** -1.315*** 
(0.364) (0.621) (0.463) 
Population Density 
(1000s of People) 
0.803*** 0.018 0.362* 
(0.193) (1.199) (0.194) 
Population 
Density*Inequality 
-0.385*** 0.327 -0.188* 
(0.103) (0.918) (0.103) 
Constant 5.350*** 11.335*** 6.580*** 
 (0.778) (1.439) (0.944) 
R-squared 0.235 0.422 0.069 
N 3093 1463 1630 






Table 2.7:  Sample Means and Sample Standard Deviations for Regressions in Table 2.6 
Variable All Counties 
Counties in States with 
greater than 88 counties 
Counties in States with 
Less than 88 Counties 
Local Gov. Revenue per 
Student 
2.722 2.611 2.822 
(2.114) (2.490) (1.702) 
State Government Revenue 
per Student 
3.944 3.846 4.033 
(1.211) (1.050) (1.333) 
Parent Revenue per Student 0.313 0.468 0.174 
(1.017) (1.134) (0.877) 
Median County Income 
(10000s of dollars) 
3.525 3.475 3.569 
(0.878) (0.822) (0.923) 
 
Percent Age 21-40 
47.038 46.994 47.078 
(4.300) (4.318) (4.284) 
 
Percent HS Dropout 
22.656 24.370 21.118 
(8.717) (9.179) (7.976) 
Percent with a Bachelor’s 
Degree 
16.494 15.278 17.585 
(7.770) (7.222) (8.078) 
Percent that attends Church 0.532 0.544 0.522 
(0.184) (0.173) (0.193) 
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.218 0.210 0.225 
(0.172) (0.173) (0.172) 
Percent under age 18 25.491 25.343 25.624 
(3.177) (2.969) (3.348) 
Percent in Private School 2.381 2.256 2.493 
(1.455) (1.395) (1.497) 
County Inequality 
(Mean/Median income) 
1.269 1.267 1.271 
(0.123) (0.127) (0.120) 
Population Density 
(1000s of People) 
0.208 0.173 0.240 
(1.207) (0.558) (1.577) 
Population 
Density*Inequality 
0.284 0.220 0.342 
(2.165) (0.717) (2.903) 







SPREADING THE WEALTH:  THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 
 OF REDISTRIBUTION 
I. Introduction 
The Political Geography of the United States refers to how the political views of 
the nation change based on the location around the country.  This is used to identify 
which parts of the nation support different political parties and the staple of US political 
geography is the Electoral College map for US Presidential Elections.  What the Electoral 
College map reveals is that in the past twenty years the political geography of the United 
States on the national level has been remarkably consistent.  The Northeast, Upper 
Midwest, and West Coasts all strongly support the Democratic Party in national elections 
where the South and Great Plains support the Republican Party.  But simply knowing 
what party an area supports does not tell us with great precision how an area feels about 
specific issues.  National party platforms consist of a log-rolling of issues in which 
individual voters’ support may vary in terms of importance (Poole and Rosenthal 2000).  
The key issue here is the idea of moral preferences versus economic preferences.   
Moral preferences refer to a party’s position on issues such as gay rights, prayer 
in school, and the legality of abortion.  Economic issues refer to a party’s position on 
taxes, levels of redistribution, and provision of public goods.  The weights that an 
individual voter places on each of the issues can greatly influence how they vote 
(Ansolabehere et al 2006).  When identifying the view voters have on just economic 




the complete story since it is not certain whether they  voted based of economic or moral 
issues.  This paper seeks to identify the geographical impact of a voter’s views on the 
level of taxation and redistribution done by the government.  Geographic impact refers to 
how the economic and social conditions of the environment around a voter impact his or 
her preferences.  This is in contrast to focusing solely on a voter’s individual 
characteristics such as income, education, religious activities, etc.  This is done in an 
attempt to reconcile why income appears to affect the preferences of different areas of the 
country in different ways (Gelman et.al. 2007), and solve the mystery of wealthy urban 
Democrats.   
Most political economy models focus only on individual characteristics, yet 
ignore the potential impacts the environment surrounding the voter has on his or her 
preferences.  In terms of preferences toward redistribution, conventional wisdom suggests 
that the higher an individual’s income the less they will support increasing redistribution.  
This makes sense because as the higher an individual’s income, the higher the cost of 
redistribution.  However, Gelman et. al. (2007) shows income has a differential effect on 
political preferences depending on where in the nation you look.  In rural areas, there is a 
high correlation between income and electoral preference, with the top quintile of income 
earners heavily favoring the Republican Party and the bottom quintile heavily supporting 
Democrats.  In densely populated urban areas, income has a positive correlation with 
political preference, but is much weaker, as being in the top quintile of income earners 
gives the voter an approximate 50-50 chance of supporting the Republican Party.  It is 




The contribution of this paper is to identify the degree the environment a voter 
lives in affects his or her policy preferences.  In densely populated, urban areas there is a 
greater degree of interaction between individuals, and if income inequality and social 
diversity are present, there is a greater degree of interaction between economic and social 
classes as well.  This interaction between classes could drive the preferences individuals 
have towards redistribution, namely the higher income earners, who foot the bill for 
redistribution. When interactions between economic and social classes are high, an 
individual is more exposed to the negative aspects of income inequality such as crime and 
other social unrest.  Because of this, those individuals are in a much better position to 
observe the benefits of a more equitable distribution of income such as decreased crime 
and increased social harmony.  In such a situation, an individual may choose to favor 
higher taxes because they receive a higher benefit than would a similar voter in rural area 
who would not see the benefits to such a high degree.   
II. Literature Review 
There is a considerable literature on the determination of redistribution for a country.  
However, this literature focuses on the assumption that lower income earners will always 
vote for redistribution where the upper income earners will vote against it, completely 
ignoring any motivation the wealthy could have for favoring redistribution.  Meltzer and 
Richard (1981) first theorized a model describing how much redistribution to expect 
within an area by a government with majoritarian vote and universal suffrage.  The 
theory predicts that as income inequality grows, the number of low income earners will 




vote for redistribution.  The motivation stems from since the wealthy pay the cost of the 
redistribution they are against it.  However this fails to account for the benefit of 
redistribution that could drive wealthy preferences.  Empirically, there is not much 
evidence suggesting a strong correlation between income inequality and the level of 
redistribution from a government (Gelman et al. 2010, Dion 2010, and Borck 2007).  The 
main reason for this is the assumption that everyone votes.  Evidence suggests that lower 
income earners are much less likely to vote than their affluent counterparts and this leads 
to less votes for redistribution than there would be if everyone voted (Galbraith and Hale 
2008, Rosenstone 1982).  However, cases where voter turnout is high, which tends to be 
driven by more poor individuals voting, there seems to be better performance by the 
Democratic Party (Hansford and Gomes 2012).   
There is also a considerable literature on the impact of population density and 
urbanization on electoral preferences.  There is a long history of urban areas supporting 
higher level of redistribution, yet again, most of the theories focus on the fact that the 
large concentration of low income voters as the reason (Rodden 2010, Bartles 2010, 
Glaeser and Ward 2005, Glaeser et al. 2008). While income inequality exists all over the 
country, there is no doubt that there is a greater concentration of lower-class individuals 
in cities than in rural areas (Glaeser and Kahn, 2008).  This has historically been driven 
by the fact that even though the poor may be faced with higher unemployment in urban 
areas the higher expected wage found in cities compared to the farm drove the lower 




poor in the cities allows for easier political mobilization and participation than is present 
in rural areas. (Rodden 2010). 
While nearly all previous literature focuses on redistribution in the context of the low 
income earners vote for and the rich vote against, there is a line of research that seeks to 
explain why the wealthy could be in favor of redistribution.  Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006) developed a theory to explain why we see similar social programs exist in nations 
with differing government structures.  For Example, A Dictator who has sole control over 
a country’s policies may choose to give away some of his resources by means of 
redistribution and social welfare programs.  In this case, though he prefers to keep as 
many resources as possible, he much more prefers power, and if he must cede resources 
to maintain control, he is quite willing to do so.  The same can be said for a rich 
individual in an unequal society, though he would love to keep his money, social 
harmony/maintaining the status quo is desirable.  If one can relinquish some resources to 
better maintain harmony, some people would vote for that.  Additionally, high levels of 
income inequality are associated with higher crime (Alesina and Giuliano 2009).  If crime 
is a function of income inequality, reducing the benefits of crime through a more 
equitable distribution of income may also be a useful crime deterrent (Alesina and 
Giuliano 2009). 
Aside from economic diversity affecting how the wealthy view redistribution, diverse 
ethnic interactions may also drive an individual’s electoral preferences.  Alesina et al 
(1999) showed that in areas that have a high degree of ethnic diversity, there are fewer 




resources tends to cross ethnic lines, which make it unpopular to voters in the area.  This 
shows the necessity to control for the ethnic diversity of an area when estimating the 
demand for redistribution.   
Finally, private charity plays a large role in the demand for redistribution.  This is 
because charity is redistribution.  While this paper focuses on public redistribution, done 
by the government sector through forced taxation, charity is a voluntary form of 
redistribution.  Even though rural areas may not have as many interactions between 
individuals of differing economic classes is does not mean there are not these 
interactions.  In rural areas, while there is a demand for redistribution, it tends to be the 
case that redistribution is satisfied by private charity without the need for government 
forced redistribution (Brooks 2006).  Brooks provides an extensive survey on the role of 
charity in the United States and his findings suggest that Republicans and namely voters 
in the rural areas of the country contribute much more to charity than do their Democratic 
and urban counterparts.  This is driven by two key factors.  One is that religious 
individuals give much more to charity than non-religious individuals, and participation in 
religious activities is much higher in rural areas as opposed to urban areas.  Secondly, 
individuals in rural areas simply believe that private charity is more efficient than public 
redistribution.   
Part of this can be explained by the quality of interactions that occur in different parts 
of the country.  Interactions between economic and social classes in rural areas tend to be 
much less anonymous than those in urban areas and charity tend to flow much more 




Additionally, redistribution is a public good, if anyone gives money to help a poor 
individual everyone get the benefit of that person having an extra dollar without having to 
bear the cost themselves.  From the Samuelson (1954) view of public goods, as the 
number of participants in an economy increases the gap between efficient provision of 
the public good and the equilibrium provision of the public good grow.  This means in 
urban areas with many more people than rural areas there are many more instances of 
free-riding on the charity of others which makes the necessity of public redistribution 
larger.  Additionally, religious views could act as a third party enforcement mechanism 
that reduces the free-riding of others charitable activities in rural areas. 
III. Data and Empirical Specifications 
To investigate the impact of the environment surrounding individuals on their public 
policy preferences, this paper utilizes two datasets that survey potential voters’ views on 
basic policy topics such as tax rates, welfare provision and other aids to low(or no) 
income earners.  The wealth of this dataset is that there are demographic variables 
presented for each respondent, which allows us to control for income, age, sex, race, 
education, and religious attendance.  But it also provides a location where the respondent 
lives, which is used to find demographic data of the area the respondent lives, and thus 
the economic and social environment he or she resides.  This information includes 
population density, ethnic makeup, income inequality, and gender and age make-up of 
the area.  The first dataset is the National Election Survey (NES) which is very useful 
because it contains the congressional district the respondent lives which provides a fairly 




the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES).  This dataset is particularly valuable 
due to the large number of observations for each year, upwards of 5000 per year where 
the NES dataset contains approximately 1000 observations per year.  However, the 
smallest level of geography reported for each respondent is the state level.  This means 
the environmental conditions of the respondent will not be as precisely measured.  Each 
dataset contains surveys from each US Presidential election from 2000-2008.   
Instead of focusing on how each respondent voted in each election, this paper focuses 
on the views the respondents expressed on policy issues such as increasing taxes, welfare 
and aid payments to the poor, and how they feel about the government’s responsibility to 
reduce income inequality.  There are some survey questions that appear in every survey 
but some only appear in one year’s survey.  The special case is taxes.  Though there is a 
question based on taxes in each of the three years, each year the question is phrased 
slightly different.  To be explicit, in the NES survey, the tax question for 2000 asks if the 
federal government budget surplus should go to tax cuts.  For 2004 the question asks if 
the respondent pays the right amount of taxes and for 2008 the respondent is asked 
whether the Federal budget deficit should be decreased by raising taxes.  For each of the 
questions the respondent’s response was coded as 1 for increasing taxes (or not cutting 
taxes), 0 for keeping taxes constant (or indifferent of increasing or decreasing), and -1 for 
cutting taxes (or strongly opposing a tax increase).  For the NAES survey, the 2000 
respondent was asked if the top tax bracket should be reduced, the 2004 respondent was 
asked if the Bush tax cuts should be extended, and the 2008 respondent was asked if they, 




coded the same as the NES survey results.  To control for these different questions each 
year, the regressions was run using all the years as well as each year separately. 
 For the NES survey, this paper also includes a question on the respondent’s view 
of welfare spending, which was the exact same question in each year.  The respondent 
responded with:  1, increase spending, 0, keep spending the same, or -1, cut spending.  
The other question that was asked the exact same in each year of the sample was how the 
respondent feels regarding spending on aid to the poor.   The possible responses were the 
same as for welfare spending.  It is important to include these questions because it 
focuses solely on redistribution where tax questions say nothing about where the money 
will go.  The last question used in this paper for the NES data was a question that only 
appeared in the 2004 survey that asks how the respondent feels about how much taxes the 
rich should pay.  Again the responses range from 1 being they pay too little, 0, they pay 
the right amount, and -1, they pay too much.  For each question the higher the number 
corresponds to the more favorable the respondent is to more spending or higher taxes. 
For the NAES survey, aside from the questions on taxes, there are two other questions 
used in this analysis that only appeared in the 2000 survey.  The first question was:  
should the Federal Government give health insurance to the unemployed?  The responses 
were coded 1 for yes, 0 for indifferent, and -1, for no, again the larger the number 
reflecting the more the respondent favors redistributive spending patterns.  The final 
question asked the respondent whether the Federal Government should reduce income 
inequality in the country.  The response to this question was binary, where 1 means that 




To estimate the impact on the economic environment around the respondent to their 
views on these issues this paper employs an ordered probit model
3
.  As stated above, the 
responses to each question were coded such that a 1 response corresponds to being 
favorable of higher taxes or more spending on redistributive services, a 0 response 
corresponds to indifference on increasing taxes or spending, or a desire to have each 
category remain constant.  Finally a -1 response signifies the respondent wants taxes 
lowered, or there to be less spending on redistributive programs.   
To control for other determinants of policy preferences various demographic 
information about each respondent is used.  These variables are:  income, age, sex, if the 
respondent attends a religious service (Church), if the respondent attends said service 
every week (Every Week), dummy variables for if the respondent dropped out of high 
school (dropout) graduated college (College Degree), earned an Advanced Degree and 
dummies on if the respondent is black or Hispanic.  Additionally, variables were included 
to control for the environment around the voter.  These variable include the gender make-
up of the district or state, the median age of the area, the ethnic fragmentation (the 
probability two randomly drawn individuals are of different ethnic groups, constructed 
from Alesina et. al. (1999)) of the area and year dummies for samples that include more 
than one year. 
Finally, variables to capture the economic environment around the respondent 
include:  population density measured in 1000s of people per square mile, income 
inequality of an area, and the product of population density and income inequality.  In 
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order to measure the degree of income inequality in an area, two measures are used for 
each regression.  The first measure is mean income of an area divided by the median 
income; this gives a measure of income skewness of an area.  The second measure is the 
median income of an area divided by the 10
th
 percentile of income in the area.  The larger 
this number is the bigger the gap is between the median income earner and the poor 
people around them.  The product of income inequality and population density can be 
thought of in two ways.  The first is an increase in this variable is increasing the number 
of interactions for a given level of inequality.  The second is an increase of this variable 
represents an increase in inequality for a given level of interactions.  All three variables, 
inequality, population density, and the interaction between the two are included in each 
regression.  
According to the theory explained earlier in the paper the impact that the environment 
has should be isolated toward the upper income earners in an area.  If a low income 
earner is in favor of redistribution it does not matter if there is more or less poor people in 
the area.  Because of this is it really the upper income earners that we would like to 
isolate to see how the economic environment of the respondent affects their preferences.  
To do this, each regression is run using the entire sample and then also run using just the 
top half of income earners in the sample.  For the NES survey, the top half of income 
includes anyone who reports to make more than $47,500 per year and for the NAES 
survey is includes anyone who reported to make more than $55,000 per year.  This means 
for each question, there are 4 regressions reported.  One for the full sample, using 




using mean/median, one using median/10
th
 percentile as the inequality measure using the 
full sample, and finally, one using median/10
th




Each table reports the marginal results for the probability of a responding choosing 1, 
or increasing taxes in some way or increasing spending on redistributive services.  Table 
3.1 reports the results marginal results for the probability of a respondent in increase the 
amount of money spent on welfare by the federal government.  The environmental 
variables have some significance in these regressions.  Using the full sample for both 
measures of inequality ethnic fragmentation has a significant negative impact on welfare 
spending.  Column (1) shows that income inequality, population density and the 
interaction between the two are all significant.  Income inequality and population density 
alone are both positive while the interaction between the two is negative.  To place these 
results in context, a one standard deviation increase in population density (using column 
(1) of table 3.3) increases the probability of favoring welfare spending by 4.76 percentage 
points using regression (1) and 2.02 percentage points using regression (3). 
Table 3.2 reports the results for the dependent variable of how the respondent feels 
about increasing aid to the poor.  In these regressions, the only environmental variable 
that is significant is the interaction between population density and income inequality.  
The results are not very robust however, as using mean/median as inequality provides a 
positive impact on aid to the poor but using median/10
th




value.  Using column (1) a one standard deviation increase in population density using 
column (3) of table 3.3) increases the probability of supporting an increase in aid to the 
poor by approximately 1.5 percentage points.   
Table 3.4 presents one of the main results of the paper, the impact the environmental 
factors have on the view of taxes to these respondents.  For table 3.4, all of the years are 
included, even though the questions on taxes were different for each year, they all 
included a response suggesting if the respondent was for, indifferent or against raising 
taxes.  Tables 3.5 and 3.7 look at the same issue but separate the samples by year to 
account for the difference in the questions.  Columns (1) and (3) represent the full 
samples and the interaction term is insignificant in both cases.  However, when the 
sample is limited to only the top half of income earners, the interaction term becomes 
significant and positive.  This suggests that while the environmental factors may not 
affect all the respondents, there is a significant impact on the upper income earners.  
Interestingly enough, using column (2) a one standard deviation increase in population 
density (from column (2) of table 6) decreases the probability of favoring a tax increase 
by 1.7 percentage points.  This suggests that there are some components of urban areas 
that decrease the favorability of higher taxes (represented by the coefficient on population 
density) but the component cause by the interaction between economic classes leads to an 
increase in the favorability of higher taxes.   
 Table 3.5 splits the sample used in table 4 by years.  Columns (1) and (4) 
represent 2000, columns (2) and (5) represent 2004 and Columns (3) and (6) represent 




environmental variable that is significant in ethnic fragmentation of the district in 2004.  
However when referring to table (7) which presents the same regressions yet using only 
the top half of income earners in the sample, 2008 yields regressions in which population 
density, income inequality and the interaction between the two are significant.  A one 
standard deviation increase in population density decreases support for decreasing the 
deficit by raising taxes by 4.6 percentage points.  Though just as table 3.4, though 
population density as a whole has a negative impact on support for tax increases the 
impact of the interaction between economic classes is positive and significant.  Using 
column (6) a one standard deviation increase in population density increases the support 
for tax increases by 1.97 percentage points, where again, the interaction term is positive 
and significant. 
 Table 3.8 is the final table using the NES survey and it asks the question of how 
the respondents feel about the tax rates of the rich.  This question was only asked for the 
2004 survey.  The only regression where the interaction term is significant is column (1) 
using the full sample and mean/median as the inequality measure.  Even in this 
regression, the variable is only significant at the 15% level.  When the sample only 
includes the top half of income earners, none of the variables of interest are significant. 
Table 3.10 begins the use of the NAES data set which has many more 
observations but once again only contains geographical data of the state the respondent 
lives as opposed to the NES dataset that hand what congressional district the respondent 
resides.  Table 3.10 represents the full sample of all years how respondents feel about 




different for each year so the tables that follow divide the questions by years.  In each one 
of these regressions the interaction term between population density and income 
inequality are all positive and significant.  Additionally ethnic fragmentation is positive 
and significant using the full sample.  Population density alone is negative and significant 
at the 99% level of every regression except for regression (4) where it is significant at the 
95% level.  A one standard deviation increase in population density (from column (1) and 
(2) from table 3.12) decreases the probability of supporting a tax increase from between 
2.4-1.3 percentage points, the interaction term remains positive and significant. 
 Table 3.11 reports the results from looking just at the year 2000’s tax question 
which asked whether or not the top tax brackets should be reduced.  Again a response of 
1 means they do NOT think the taxes should be reduced where a response of 0 means the 
respondent was indifferent and a response of -1 means the respondent thought the tax 
brackets should be reduced.  Columns (1) and (3) represent the full sample and (2) and 
(4) represent the top half of income earners in the sample.  In each regression except for 
column (4), all the interaction terms are positive and significant, yet much like table 10, a 
one standard deviation increase in population density (from columns (3) and (4) from 
table 3.12) decreases the support for increasing taxes by between 8.7 and 4.5 percentage 
points.  Ethnic fragmentation is positive and significant in both full sample regressions, 
and population density alone in regressions (1), (2), and (3) are all negative and 
significant at the 99% level. 
Tables 3.13 and 3.14 report the results for the tax question for 2004 and 2008, yet 




inequality is significant is column (1) of table 3.14 which is the full sample of 2008 using 
mean/median for inequality.  However, looking at columns (3) and (4) for table 3.14 we 
see that the inequality measure is positive and significant at the 1% level.  Income 
inequality is positive and significant using regression (2) of table 3.13 and negative and 
significant using regression (3) and (4) of table 3.13. 
Finally, tables 3.16 and 3.17 represent questions to specific policy issues.  Table 
3.16 uses the question on whether the federal government should provide health 
insurance to the unemployed, and table 3.17 asks if the government should reduce 
income inequality.  Interestingly, the interaction term for every regression in both tables 
is significant and negative, which is different than what the tax regressions would 
suggest.  However, a one standard deviation increase in population density (from table 
3.18) increases the probability of supporting health insurance to the unemployed by 
between 3.95 and 10.4 percentage points, where a one standard deviation increase in 
population density increases the probability of supporting reducing income inequality by 
3.3 to 6.9 percentage points.  
 What all these results illustrate is that it seems the economic and social 
environment individuals live does play a significant role in their preferences on public 
policy.  Why the exact results of these regressions provide somewhat mixed results, it 
simply means that more investigation and richer data sources are needed to truly pin 
down exactly how these environment factors affect preferences on public policy. 




Individual characteristics of voters such as income, age, education, race and religion 
certainly impact their preferences toward public policy.  However, much less investigated 
is the impact that the environment around the individual has in the shaping of his or her 
preferences.  In particular, the economic environment that an individual lives plays a role 
in how he or she feels about public policy.  Even if an individual is wealthy, if he lives in 
an area full of inequality with a lot of daily interaction between economic classes his 
views on taxation and redistribution could be different than if he lived and interacted only 
with individuals of his same economic class.  This paper asks the question what impact 
this interaction between economic classes has on such views.  The findings suggest that 
as interaction between economic classes increases, whether it is by an increase in 
population density for a given level of income inequality of an increase in inequality for a 
given level of population density, there is evidence for individuals to support higher taxes 
which could help support public programs to help the lower income earners in the area.  
This also contributes to how we view the impact income inequality has on public policy 
preferences.  Prior to this research, it was common practice for income inequality to only 
be used as a measure for how much low income earners outnumber the rich, best suited 
for aggregate data regressions.  This paper takes the stance that inequality itself plays a 
role in how an individual determines his political preferences.  By considering the impact 
that inequality has on the upper income earners, it gives us a much clearer view of 
exactly how public policy preferences are determined in the country and provides insight 
into how demographic changes around the country will influence public policy in the 




Table 3.1:  Ordered Probit Marginal Results for Increasing level of Welfare by the Federal Government 
using NES (district level) Survey Data 
(Standard Errors are presented in Parenthesis) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income (in $10000) -0.012*** -0.006*** -0.012*** -0.006*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female (d) 0.043*** 0.062*** 0.042*** 0.061*** 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
Married (d) -0.032*** -0.022+ -0.033*** -0.023+ 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
Church (d) -0.010 -0.019 -0.010 -0.019 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
Every Week (d) -0.037*** -0.031* -0.035** -0.031* 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) 
Dropout (d) 0.048** 0.025 0.049** 0.026 
(0.020) (0.037) (0.020) (0.037) 
College Degree (d) 0.039** 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.052*** 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.084*** 0.095*** 0.084*** 0.097*** 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
Black (d) 0.114*** 0.125*** 0.115*** 0.125*** 
(0.019) (0.028) (0.019) (0.028) 
Hispanic (d) 0.066*** 0.069** 0.072*** 0.074*** 
(0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.027) 
Percent of District 
Female 
0.002+ 0.004* 0.003* 0.004* 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Median age of 
District 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Ethnic Fragmentation -0.137*** -0.012 -0.094** 0.023 
(0.044) (0.055) (0.042) (0.052) 
Year 2004 (d) 0.098*** 0.092*** 0.102*** 0.098*** 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) 
Year 2008 (d) 0.254*** 0.263** 0.278*** 0.289*** 
(0.084) (0.108) (0.085) (0.109) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
0.127* 0.109   
(0.071) (0.084)   
Population Density 
(1000 per square 
mile) 
0.025** 0.015 -0.004 -0.000 




-0.012** -0.007   




percentile of Income 
ratio 
  -0.010 -0.014 
  (0.009) (0.010) 
Density*Median-10 
Ratio 
  0.002** 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
R-squared 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.039 
N 4014 2033 4014 2033 




























































Table 3.2:  Ordered Probit Marginal Results for Increasing level of Aid to the Poor by the Federal 
Government using NES (district level) Survey Data 
(Standard Errors are presented in Parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income (in $10000) -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.014*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female (d) 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.072*** 
(0.015) (0.022) (0.015) (0.022) 
Married (d) -0.007 0.003 -0.008 0.002 
(0.016) (0.024) (0.016) (0.024) 
Church (d) -0.031* -0.045* -0.031* -0.045* 
(0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025) 
Every Week (d) -0.051** -0.053* -0.051** -0.052* 
(0.021) (0.030) (0.021) (0.030) 
Dropout (d) 0.011 0.075 0.012 0.073 
(0.026) (0.056) (0.026) (0.057) 
College Degree (d) -0.060*** -0.037+ -0.059*** -0.034 
(0.020) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025) 
Advanced Degree 
(d) 
0.000 0.037 0.001 0.040 
(0.027) (0.032) (0.027) (0.032) 
Black (d) 0.242*** 0.323*** 0.243*** 0.325*** 
(0.020) (0.030) (0.020) (0.030) 
Hispanic (d) 0.130*** 0.149*** 0.132*** 0.154*** 
(0.025) (0.036) (0.025) (0.036) 
Percent of District 
Female 
0.007** 0.008* 0.007*** 0.009** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Median age of 
District 
0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
0.077 0.120 0.067 0.118 
(0.063) (0.089) (0.059) (0.085) 
Year 2004 (d) 0.078*** 0.082*** 0.079*** 0.088*** 
(0.019) (0.028) (0.019) (0.028) 
Year 2008 (d) 0.394*** 0.423*** 0.406*** 0.458*** 
(0.093) (0.151) (0.092) (0.148) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
0.022 -0.058   
(0.106) (0.142)   
Population Density 
(1000 per square 
mile) 
-0.026 -0.023 -0.000 -0.000 




0.022+ 0.020   






  -0.007 -0.037** 
  (0.013) (0.017) 
Density*Median-10 
Ratio 
  0.002 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
R-squared 0.067 0.062 0.066 0.063 




(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 






Table 3.3:  Sample Means and Sample Standard Deviations  for Tables 1 and 2 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
View on 
Welfare/Aid to poor 
-0.105 -0.192 0.502 0.419 
(0.745) (0.725) (0.645) (0.667) 
Income (in $10000) 4.992 8.046 4.973 8.047 
(4.213) (3.876) (4.206) (3.869) 
Age 45.975 45.650 46.035 45.628 
(16.319) (13.894) (16.390) (13.898) 
Female (d) 0.542 0.468 0.542 0.467 
(0.498) (0.499) (0.498) (0.499) 
Married (d) 0.559 0.684 0.557 0.684 
(0.497) (0.465) (0.497) (0.465) 
Church (d) 0.437 0.457 0.434 0.455 
(0.496) (0.498) (0.496) (0.498) 
Every Week (d) 0.237 0.233 0.239 0.235 
(0.425) (0.423) (0.427) (0.424) 
Dropout (d) 0.109 0.039 0.111 0.040 
(0.312) (0.193) (0.314) (0.196) 
College Degree (d) 0.185 0.259 0.185 0.260 
(0.388) (0.438) (0.388) (0.439) 
Advanced Degree 
(d) 
0.094 0.152 0.094 0.152 
(0.291) (0.359) (0.291) (0.360) 
Black (d) 0.158 0.119 0.159 0.121 
(0.365) (0.324) (0.366) (0.326) 
Hispanic (d) 0.118 0.110 0.118 0.111 
(0.322) (0.313) (0.323) (0.314) 
Percent of District 
Female 
36.100 32.957 36.114 32.863 
(21.228) (21.972) (21.246) (21.989) 
Median age of 
District 
36.203 36.541 36.198 36.535 
(3.216) (3.158) (3.216) (3.164) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
0.345 0.355 0.345 0.354 
(0.163) (0.162) (0.163) (0.162) 
Year 2004 (d) 0.263 0.307 0.264 0.307 
(0.440) (0.461) (0.441) (0.462) 
Year 2008 (d) 0.347 0.418 0.347 0.420 
(0.476) (0.493) (0.476) (0.494) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
1.316 1.319 1.315 1.319 
(0.093) (0.097) (0.093) (0.097) 
Population Density 
(1000 per square 
mile) 
1.761 1.941 1.765 1.941 




2.516 2.796 2.522 2.797 




3.957 3.981 3.960 3.984 
(0.703) (0.732) (0.701) (0.729) 
Obs. 4014 2033 4012 2020 
Note:  Column (1) reports the statistics for the view on Welfare using the entire sample.  Column (2) reports the 
statistics for the view on welfare using top half of income earners.  Column (3) is aid to the poor with the full sample 





Table 3.4:  Ordered Probit Marginal Results for Increasing Taxes using NES (district level) Survey Data 
(Standard Errors are presented in Parenthesis) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income (in $10000) -0.003+ -0.003 -0.002+ -0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female (d) -0.033*** -0.040** -0.032*** -0.039** 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) 
Married (d) -0.006 0.030* -0.006 0.029* 
(0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) 
Church (d) -0.013 -0.017 -0.013 -0.016 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) 
Every Week (d) -0.043*** -0.051** -0.043*** -0.050** 
(0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) 
Dropout (d) -0.013 -0.042 -0.013 -0.044 
(0.020) (0.040) (0.020) (0.040) 
College Degree (d) 0.090*** 0.083*** 0.090*** 0.085*** 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.152*** 0.149*** 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028) 
Black (d) -0.013 -0.016 -0.013 -0.013 
(0.018) (0.027) (0.018) (0.027) 
Hispanic (d) 0.012 0.014 0.012 0.018 
(0.022) (0.031) (0.022) (0.031) 
Percent of District 
Female 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Median age of 
District 
0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.022 0.031 0.005 0.014 
(0.048) (0.068) (0.045) (0.065) 
Year 2004 (d) -0.017 -0.061*** -0.018 -0.058*** 
(0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) 
Year 2008 (d) -0.161** -0.123 -0.165** -0.100 
(0.064) (0.099) (0.064) (0.102) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
-0.019 -0.038   
(0.077) (0.103)   
Population Density 
(1000 per square 
mile) 
-0.011 -0.023+ 0.002 -0.008 










percentile of Income 
ratio 
  0.003 -0.018 
  (0.010) (0.013) 
Density*Median-10 
Ratio 
  -0.000 0.002+ 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
R-squared 0.021 0.029 0.021 0.029 
N 3899 1983 3899 1983 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 




Table 3.5:  Ordered Probit Marginal Results for Increasing Taxes  by year using NES Survey Data 
(Standard Errors are presented in Parenthesis) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income (in 
$10000) 
-0.003 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.003 -0.003*** 0.001 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) 
Age 0.004*** 0.000** -0.001 0.004*** 0.000* -0.001 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female (d) -0.068*** -0.006 -0.017 -0.069*** -0.006 -0.017 
(0.025) (0.006) (0.022) (0.025) (0.006) (0.022) 
Married (d) -0.018 0.004 0.014 -0.019 0.004 0.014 
(0.025) (0.006) (0.025) (0.025) (0.006) (0.025) 
Church (d) -0.032 -0.007 0.005 -0.031 -0.007 0.004 
(0.028) (0.007) (0.026) (0.028) (0.007) (0.026) 
Every Week (d) -0.093*** -0.014** -0.004 -0.092*** -0.014** -0.005 
(0.031) (0.007) (0.030) (0.031) (0.007) (0.030) 
Dropout (d) -0.065+ 0.009 0.020 -0.066+ 0.009 0.019 
(0.040) (0.013) (0.036) (0.040) (0.013) (0.035) 
College Degree 
(d) 
0.101*** 0.027** 0.123*** 0.101*** 0.028** 0.122*** 
(0.033) (0.011) (0.037) (0.032) (0.011) (0.037) 
Advanced 
Degree (d) 
0.211*** 0.044*** 0.192*** 0.209*** 0.044*** 0.191*** 
(0.046) (0.017) (0.056) (0.046) (0.017) (0.056) 
Black (d) -0.057 -0.012+ 0.055* -0.059+ -0.011+ 0.051+ 
(0.041) (0.008) (0.033) (0.041) (0.008) (0.033) 
Hispanic (d) 0.022 0.026 0.017 0.022 0.025 0.014 
(0.049) (0.043) (0.032) (0.049) (0.043) (0.032) 
Percent of 
District Female 
-0.014 -0.001+ -0.005 -0.013 -0.001* -0.005 
(0.014) (0.000) (0.015) (0.013) (0.001) (0.015) 
Median age of 
District 
0.008+ -0.002+ 0.005 0.008+ -0.002+ 0.005 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.008) (0.005) (0.001) (0.008) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
0.103 -0.034 0.005 0.108 -0.037+ 0.010 




-0.019 0.020 -0.011    
(0.176) (0.038) (0.190)    
Population 
Density (1000 
per square mile) 
0.003 -0.002 -0.058 -0.002 0.000 -0.012 




0.001 0.001 0.040    






   -0.019 0.005 0.009 
   (0.022) (0.005) (0.019) 
Density*Median-
10 Ratio 
   0.002 -0.000 0.002 
   (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
R-squared 0.035 0.024 0.017 0.035 0.025 0.017 
N 1585 1037 1277 1585 1037 1277 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note:  Columns (1) and (4) refer to year 2000, Columns (2) and (5) refer to year 2004, and columns (3) and 





Table 3.6:  Sample Means and Sample Standard Deviations for Tables 4 and 5 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
View on Taxes -0.355 -0.341 -0.254 -0.358 -0.478 
(0.831) (0.828) (0.953) (0.556) (0.837) 
Income (in 
$10000) 
4.965 7.971 3.376 5.929 6.154 
(4.160) (3.810) (3.255) (4.273) (4.424) 
Age 46.080 45.769 46.233 47.052 45.099 
(16.281) (13.881) (16.763) (16.442) (15.483) 
Female (d) 0.541 0.464 0.550 0.525 0.543 
(0.498) (0.499) (0.498) (0.500) (0.498) 
Married (d) 0.559 0.684 0.515 0.526 0.640 
(0.497) (0.465) (0.500) (0.500) (0.480) 
Church (d) 0.434 0.455 0.430 0.452 0.426 
(0.496) (0.498) (0.495) (0.498) (0.495) 
Every Week (d) 0.241 0.238 0.254 0.217 0.244 
(0.428) (0.426) (0.436) (0.412) (0.430) 
Dropout (d) 0.106 0.039 0.101 0.077 0.136 
(0.308) (0.193) (0.301) (0.267) (0.343) 
College Degree 
(d) 
0.187 0.262 0.208 0.190 0.158 
(0.390) (0.440) (0.406) (0.392) (0.365) 
Advanced 
Degree (d) 
0.096 0.154 0.099 0.126 0.067 
(0.295) (0.361) (0.299) (0.332) (0.251) 
Black (d) 0.155 0.117 0.113 0.145 0.217 
(0.362) (0.322) (0.317) (0.352) (0.412) 
Hispanic (d) 0.111 0.105 0.076 0.011 0.235 
(0.314) (0.306) (0.265) (0.102) (0.424) 
Percent of 
District Female 
36.960 33.724 50.969 52.037 7.330 
(20.961) (21.825) (1.035) (6.151) (1.714) 
Median age of 
District 
36.205 36.552 35.528 36.694 36.649 
(3.194) (3.161) (2.798) (2.939) (3.670) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
0.343 0.353 0.319 0.337 0.377 
(0.164) (0.162) (0.165) (0.176) (0.144) 
Year 2004 (d) 0.266 0.315    
(0.442) (0.465)    
Year 2008 (d) 0.328 0.400    




1.314 1.318 1.294 1.313 1.341 
(0.094) (0.098) (0.094) (0.102) (0.078) 
Population 
Density (1000 
per square mile) 
1.775 1.945 1.817 1.854 1.660 




2.539 2.804 2.644 2.704 2.275 




3.946 3.970 3.757 4.007 4.131 
(0.702) (0.731) (0.660) (0.682) (0.710) 
Obs. 3899 1983 1585 1037 1277 
Note:  Column (1) refers to variable for increasing taxes for all years using the full sample.  Column (2) refers to 
the variable for increasing taxes in all years using top half of income earners.  Column (3), (4), and (5) refer to 




Table 3.7:  Ordered Probit Marginal Results for Increasing Taxes  by year for top half of income  using 
NES (district level) Survey Data 
(Standard Errors are presented in Parenthesis) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income (in 
$10000) 
-0.007 -0.003** 0.002 -0.007 -0.003** 0.002 
(0.007) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.004) 
Age 0.003* 0.000* 0.000 0.003** 0.000* 0.000 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female (d) -0.049 -0.017** -0.039 -0.057 -0.017** -0.041 
(0.045) (0.008) (0.030) (0.045) (0.007) (0.030) 
Married (d) 0.024 0.012+ 0.037 0.025 0.012* 0.035 
(0.045) (0.007) (0.036) (0.045) (0.007) (0.036) 
Church (d) -0.062 -0.001 -0.011 -0.063 -0.000 -0.009 
(0.049) (0.008) (0.035) (0.049) (0.008) (0.035) 
Every Week (d) -0.139** -0.014* -0.017 -0.142** -0.014* -0.013 
(0.056) (0.008) (0.040) (0.056) (0.008) (0.040) 
Dropout (d) -0.202+ -0.011 0.010 -0.212+ -0.011 0.004 
(0.138) (0.014) (0.069) (0.135) (0.015) (0.068) 
College Degree 
(d) 
0.072+ 0.025** 0.134*** 0.075+ 0.025** 0.140*** 
(0.049) (0.012) (0.041) (0.049) (0.012) (0.041) 
Advanced 
Degree (d) 
0.205*** 0.038** 0.209*** 0.200*** 0.038** 0.210*** 
(0.058) (0.016) (0.062) (0.058) (0.016) (0.062) 
Black (d) -0.184** -0.008 0.058 -0.184** -0.007 0.051 
(0.078) (0.010) (0.048) (0.078) (0.010) (0.049) 
Hispanic (d) -0.032 0.031 0.037 -0.033 0.030 0.032 
(0.085) (0.059) (0.045) (0.085) (0.058) (0.044) 
Percent of 
District Female 
-0.025 0.000 0.004 -0.023 -0.000 0.008 
(0.024) (0.001) (0.019) (0.025) (0.001) (0.019) 
Median age of 
District 
0.008 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.002 -0.001 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
0.155 -0.011 0.010 0.130 -0.015 0.014 




-0.048 0.011 -0.329    
(0.293) (0.041) (0.268)    
Population 
Density (1000 
per square mile) 
-0.026 -0.000 -0.207** -0.007 0.001 -0.062** 




0.019 0.001 0.146*    






   -0.056+ 0.003 -0.044* 
   (0.037) (0.006) (0.025) 
Density*Median-
10 Ratio 
   0.003 -0.000 0.012* 
   (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) 
R-squared 0.042 0.036 0.028 0.044 0.036 0.028 
N 565 624 794 565 624 794 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 






Table 3.8:  Ordered Probit Marginal Results for Increasing Taxes on the Rich  using NES (district level) 
Survey Data 
(Standard Errors are presented in Parenthesis) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income (in $10000) -0.006+ -0.013** -0.006 -0.013** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Age 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female (d) 0.102*** 0.062+ 0.108*** 0.067* 
(0.030) (0.038) (0.029) (0.038) 
Married (d) 0.012 -0.029 0.011 -0.026 
(0.032) (0.042) (0.032) (0.042) 
Church (d) 0.007 -0.031 0.004 -0.034 
(0.034) (0.044) (0.034) (0.045) 
Every Week (d) -0.054 -0.087+ -0.058 -0.090+ 
(0.042) (0.056) (0.042) (0.056) 
Dropout (d) -0.036 -0.026 -0.032 -0.020 
(0.056) (0.113) (0.057) (0.113) 
College Degree (d) -0.040 -0.048 -0.038 -0.057 
(0.039) (0.047) (0.039) (0.047) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.059 0.051 0.061 0.045 
(0.047) (0.052) (0.047) (0.053) 
Black (d) 0.110** 0.127** 0.111*** 0.129** 
(0.043) (0.062) (0.043) (0.061) 
Hispanic (d) -0.024 -0.091 -0.029 -0.098 
(0.138) (0.193) (0.139) (0.194) 
Percent of District 
Female 
0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Median age of 
District 
0.005 0.008 0.005 0.006 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.118 0.192 0.051 0.096 
(0.117) (0.160) (0.115) (0.156) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
-0.165 -0.312   
(0.189) (0.223)   
Population Density 
(1000 per square 
mile) 
-0.041 0.003 0.015 0.038 





0.030+ 0.003   





percentile of Income 
ratio 
  -0.001 0.016 




  -0.002 -0.007 
  (0.004) (0.005) 
R-squared 0.023 0.031 0.022 0.030 
N 1025 611 1025 611 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 








Table 3.9:  Sample Means and Sample Standard Deviations for Tables 7 and 8 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
View on Taxes -0.150 -0.378 -0.447 0.520 0.516 
(0.979) (0.556) (0.867) (0.674) (0.676) 
Income (in $10000) 6.595 8.475 8.555 5.903 8.524 
(3.445) (3.644) (3.940) (4.318) (3.672) 
Age 45.903 47.114 44.616 47.314 47.391 
(12.736) (14.113) (14.386) (16.593) (14.112) 
Female (d) 0.356 0.486 0.524 0.523 0.481 
(0.479) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
Married (d) 0.607 0.686 0.738 0.522 0.687 
(0.489) (0.465) (0.440) (0.500) (0.464) 
Church (d) 0.471 0.473 0.429 0.451 0.471 
(0.500) (0.500) (0.495) (0.498) (0.500) 
Every Week (d) 0.235 0.218 0.254 0.214 0.216 
(0.425) (0.413) (0.436) (0.410) (0.412) 
Dropout (d) 0.018 0.032 0.059 0.082 0.031 
(0.132) (0.176) (0.236) (0.274) (0.174) 
College Degree (d) 0.317 0.253 0.230 0.194 0.257 
(0.466) (0.435) (0.421) (0.396) (0.437) 
Advanced Degree 
(d) 
0.198 0.186 0.097 0.126 0.187 
(0.399) (0.389) (0.296) (0.332) (0.390) 
Black (d) 0.065 0.111 0.160 0.142 0.108 
(0.248) (0.314) (0.367) (0.350) (0.311) 
Hispanic (d) 0.067 0.010 0.207 0.011 0.010 
(0.251) (0.098) (0.405) (0.103) (0.099) 
Percent of District 
Female 
50.930 51.750 7.315 52.038 51.754 
(0.970) (5.267) (1.770) (6.186) (5.322) 
Median age of 
District 
35.698 36.950 36.848 36.679 36.947 
(2.677) (2.675) (3.678) (2.957) (2.695) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
0.329 0.340 0.381 0.339 0.340 
(0.165) (0.176) (0.143) (0.176) (0.177) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
1.294 1.316 1.337 1.314 1.316 
(0.102) (0.111) (0.076) (0.103) (0.111) 
Population Density 
(1000 per square 
mile) 
2.220 2.054 1.664 1.872 2.068 




3.296 3.026 2.280 2.727 3.044 




3.749 4.018 4.088 4.015 4.023 
(0.719) (0.732) (0.705) (0.682) (0.736) 
Obs. 565 624 794 1025 611 
Note:  Column (1), (2), and (3) refer to the variables for increasing taxes for the top half of income earners 
for year 2000, 2004, and 2008 respectively.  Column (4) and (5) refers to the variable for increasing taxes 






Table 3.10:  Ordered Probit Marginal Results for Increasing Taxes using all years using Annenberg (State 
Level) Survey Data 
(Standard Errors are presented in Parenthesis) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income (in $10000) 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female (d) -0.011** -0.012* -0.011** -0.012* 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Married (d) -0.011** -0.020** -0.010** -0.020** 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
Church (d) 0.044*** 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.056*** 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) 
Every Week (d) 0.049*** 0.064*** 0.049*** 0.065*** 
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) 
Dropout (d) 0.028** 0.004 0.027** 0.004 
(0.011) (0.024) (0.011) (0.024) 
College Degree (d) 0.019*** 0.019** 0.019*** 0.019** 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
Black (d) 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) 
Hispanic (d) 0.020* -0.008 0.020* -0.008 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) 
Percent of State Female -0.015*** -0.024*** -0.015*** -0.025*** 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
Median age of State 0.003+ 0.004+ 0.002 0.004+ 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.048* 0.046 0.038+ 0.040 
(0.028) (0.040) (0.025) (0.036) 
Year 2004 (d) 0.325*** 0.292*** 0.323*** 0.290*** 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) 
Year 2008 (d) 0.063*** 0.040*** 0.063*** 0.039*** 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
0.030 -0.015   
(0.060) (0.084)   
Population Density (1000 
per square mile) 
-0.320*** -0.304*** -0.068*** -0.082** 




0.203*** 0.195***   
(0.050) (0.067)   
Median-10
th
 percentile of 
Income ratio 
  0.009** 0.001 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
Density*Median-10 Ratio   0.010** 0.013** 
  (0.004) (0.005) 
R-squared 0.037 0.032 0.037 0.032 
N 26428 13540 26428 13540 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 






Table 3.11:  Ordered Probit Marginal Results for Increasing Taxes for year 2000 using Annenberg (State 
Level) Survey Data 
(Standard Errors are reported in parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income (in $10000) 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female (d) -0.068*** -0.120*** -0.068*** -0.119*** 
(0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018) 
Married (d) -0.005 -0.016 -0.004 -0.014 
(0.012) (0.024) (0.012) (0.024) 
Church (d) 0.026+ 0.057** 0.028* 0.063** 
(0.017) (0.028) (0.017) (0.028) 
Every Week (d) 0.075*** 0.131*** 0.079*** 0.139*** 
(0.017) (0.029) (0.017) (0.028) 
Dropout (d) 0.047* 0.044 0.047** 0.044 
(0.024) (0.071) (0.024) (0.072) 
College Degree (d) 0.004 0.026 0.003 0.025 
(0.014) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022) 
Advanced Degree (d) -0.035** -0.033 -0.035** -0.031 
(0.016) (0.023) (0.016) (0.023) 
Black (d) 0.022 -0.073* 0.026 -0.068* 
(0.023) (0.038) (0.023) (0.038) 
Hispanic (d) 0.042+ -0.053 0.039+ -0.052 
(0.027) (0.044) (0.027) (0.044) 
Percent of State 
Female 
0.022+ -0.007 0.021+ 0.002 
(0.015) (0.024) (0.014) (0.024) 
Median age of State -0.001 0.008 -0.005 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.136** 0.137 0.103* 0.133 
(0.069) (0.113) (0.060) (0.098) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
-0.219+ 0.014   
(0.134) (0.213)   
Population Density 
(1000 per square mile) 
-0.879*** -1.095*** -0.555*** -0.389 




0.556*** 0.687***   




of Income ratio 
  -0.041*** -0.041* 
  (0.014) (0.022) 
Density*Median-10 
Ratio 
  0.110*** 0.076 
  (0.038) (0.058) 
R-squared 0.019 0.039 0.018 0.036 
N 5828 2482 5828 2482 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 







Table 3.12:  Sample Means and Sample Standard Deviations for Tables 10 and 11 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
View on Taxes -0.267 -0.237 -0.458 -0.394 
 (0.841) (0.843) (0.872) (0.907) 
Income (in $10000) 6.216 9.359 5.437 8.973 
 (4.305) (3.797) (3.965) (3.619) 
Age 50.134 48.610 48.945 46.856 
 (15.153) (13.260) (15.840) (12.548) 
Female (d) 0.565 0.520 0.554 0.492 
 (0.496) (0.500) (0.497) (0.500) 
Married (d) 0.612 0.755 0.637 0.799 
 (0.487) (0.430) (0.481) (0.401) 
Church (d) 0.505 0.526 0.406 0.427 
 (0.500) (0.499) (0.491) (0.495) 
Every Week (d) 0.358 0.349 0.424 0.409 
 (0.480) (0.477) (0.494) (0.492) 
Dropout (d) 0.052 0.021 0.072 0.018 
 (0.222) (0.142) (0.258) (0.133) 
College Degree (d) 0.329 0.384 0.280 0.365 
 (0.470) (0.486) (0.449) (0.481) 
Advanced Degree 
(d) 0.160 0.230 0.171 0.284 
 (0.367) (0.421) (0.376) (0.451) 
Black (d) 0.082 0.062 0.071 0.050 
 (0.274) (0.242) (0.257) (0.217) 
Hispanic (d) 0.057 0.053 0.054 0.039 
 (0.233) (0.224) (0.226) (0.194) 
Percent of State 
Female 50.791 50.780 50.956 50.963 
 (0.614) (0.625) (0.619) (0.630) 
Median age of State 36.526 36.546 35.440 35.421 
 (2.082) (2.060) (1.814) (1.756) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 0.355 0.361 0.352 0.362 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.118) (0.118) 
Year 2004 0.196 0.200   
 (0.397) (0.400)   
Year 2008 0.584 0.617   
 (0.493) (0.486)   
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
1.336 1.338 1.321 1.323 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.063) (0.064) 
Population Density 
(1000 per square 
mile) 
0.251 0.273 0.232 0.269 




0.344 0.375 0.315 0.367 






4.121 4.140 3.982 4.002 




Obs. 26428 13540 5828 2482 
Note:  Column (1) refers to the tax regression using all the years; Column (2) refers to the tax regression 
using top half of income earners in all years.  Column (3) and (4) focus on taxes in 2000 using the full 





Table 3.13:  Ordered Probit Marginal Results for Increasing Taxes for year 2004 using Annenberg (State 
Level) Survey Data 
(Standard Errors are reported in parentheses 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income (in $10000) 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female (d) -0.046*** -0.058*** -0.045*** -0.057*** 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) 
Married (d) 0.073*** 0.089*** 0.072*** 0.088*** 
(0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.023) 
Church (d) 0.171*** 0.196*** 0.171*** 0.196*** 
(0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025) 
Every Week (d) 0.245*** 0.279*** 0.246*** 0.283*** 
(0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.028) 
Dropout (d) 0.028 -0.044 0.028 -0.046 
(0.031) (0.118) (0.031) (0.117) 
College Degree (d) -0.112*** -0.119*** -0.112*** -0.118*** 
(0.016) (0.023) (0.016) (0.023) 
Advanced Degree 
(d) 
-0.220*** -0.218*** -0.219*** -0.218*** 
(0.020) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025) 
Black (d) -0.141*** -0.191*** -0.143*** -0.200*** 
(0.030) (0.049) (0.030) (0.048) 
Hispanic (d) -0.016 -0.043 -0.014 -0.037 
(0.031) (0.048) (0.031) (0.048) 
Percent of State 
Female 
0.034** 0.031 0.038** 0.036+ 
(0.017) (0.024) (0.016) (0.023) 
Median age of State -0.008+ -0.019** -0.007 -0.017** 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
-0.047 -0.174 0.105 0.038 
(0.095) (0.134) (0.081) (0.114) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
0.335+ 0.505*   
(0.208) (0.291)   
Population Density 
(1000 per square 
mile) 
-0.220 -0.059 -0.169* -0.156 




0.116 0.015   






  -0.036** -0.048** 
  (0.014) (0.020) 
Density*Median-10 
Ratio 
  0.022 0.021 
  (0.016) (0.019) 
R-squared 0.046 0.056 0.046 0.056 
N 5179 2706 5179 2706 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 







Table 3.14:  Ordered Probit Marginal Results for Increasing Taxes for year 2008 using Annenberg (State 
Level) Survey Data 
(Standard Errors presented in parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income (in $10000) 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female (d) 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Married (d) -0.032*** -0.041*** -0.031*** -0.039*** 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
Church (d) -0.016** -0.027** -0.016** -0.026** 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) 
Every Week (d) -0.030*** -0.037*** -0.029*** -0.036*** 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) 
Dropout (d) 0.022* 0.023 0.021* 0.022 
(0.012) (0.022) (0.012) (0.022) 
College Degree (d) 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.048*** 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Advanced Degree 
(d) 
0.132*** 0.129*** 0.131*** 0.128*** 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
Black (d) 0.011 0.024* 0.012+ 0.025* 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) 
Hispanic (d) 0.011 0.003 0.010 -0.000 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) 
Percent of State 
Female 
-0.032*** -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.027*** 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
Median age of State 0.005*** 0.004* 0.004*** 0.004* 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
0.036 0.026 0.014 -0.014 
(0.028) (0.037) (0.026) (0.035) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
0.002 -0.128+   
(0.059) (0.079)   
Population Density 
(1000 per square 
mile) 
-0.114+ -0.037 -0.027 -0.003 




0.080* 0.036   






  0.022*** 0.017*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) 
Density*Median-10 
Ratio 
  0.005 0.002 
  (0.004) (0.005) 
R-squared 0.017 0.020 0.018 0.020 
N 15421 8352 15421 8352 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 







Table 3.15:  Summary Statistics for Tables 13 and 14 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
View on Taxes 0.170 0.169 -0.342 -0.321 
 (0.947) (0.956) (0.735) (0.737) 
Income (in $10000) 6.488 9.802 6.420 9.329 
 (4.598) (4.008) (4.293) (3.764) 
Age 50.664 48.837 50.406 49.058 
 (15.824) (13.213) (14.625) (13.439) 
Female (d) 0.548 0.486 0.575 0.540 
 (0.498) (0.500) (0.494) (0.498) 
Married (d) 0.601 0.752 0.606 0.743 
 (0.490) (0.432) (0.489) (0.437) 
Church (d) 0.689 0.709 0.481 0.496 
 (0.463) (0.454) (0.500) (0.500) 
Every Week (d) 0.123 0.105 0.413 0.411 
 (0.328) (0.307) (0.492) (0.492) 
Dropout (d) 0.055 0.007 0.043 0.026 
 (0.228) (0.084) (0.203) (0.158) 
College Degree (d) 0.338 0.414 0.343 0.381 
 (0.473) (0.493) (0.475) (0.486) 
Advanced Degree 
(d) 
0.181 0.270 0.150 0.201 
(0.385) (0.444) (0.357) (0.401) 
Black (d) 0.055 0.037 0.094 0.074 
 (0.228) (0.190) (0.292) (0.263) 
Hispanic (d) 0.055 0.045 0.060 0.060 
 (0.228) (0.208) (0.237) (0.237) 
Percent of State 
Female 
50.837 50.850 50.713 50.703 
(0.605) (0.621) (0.601) (0.611) 
Median age of State 36.320 36.286 37.005 36.964 
 (1.924) (1.916) (2.063) (2.050) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
0.378 0.385 0.348 0.354 
(0.119) (0.120) (0.110) (0.110) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
1.329 1.330 1.344 1.344 
(0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) 
Population Density 
(1000 per square 
mile) 
0.250 0.286 0.258 0.270 




0.339 0.389 0.357 0.372 






4.207 4.210 4.144 4.158 
(0.582) (0.588) (0.544) (0.554) 
Obs. 5179 2706 15421 8352 
Note:  Columns (1) and (2) refer to year 2004 and the full sample and top half of income earners 






Table 3.16:  Ordered Probit Marginal Results for Providing Health Insurance to the Unemployed for year 
2000 using Annenberg (State Level) Survey Data 
(Standard Errors presented in parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income (in $10000) -0.009*** -0.007** -0.009*** -0.006** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Age -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female (d) 0.082*** 0.107*** 0.083*** 0.107*** 
(0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) 
Married (d) -0.024* -0.046* -0.025* -0.050** 
(0.013) (0.024) (0.013) (0.024) 
Church (d) -0.044** -0.048* -0.045** -0.052* 
(0.018) (0.028) (0.018) (0.028) 
Every Week (d) -0.099*** -0.109*** -0.101*** -0.116*** 
(0.018) (0.029) (0.018) (0.029) 
Dropout (d) 0.010 -0.125* 0.010 -0.125* 
(0.025) (0.072) (0.025) (0.072) 
College Degree (d) -0.015 -0.007 -0.014 -0.006 
(0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.023) 
Advanced Degree 
(d) 
0.057*** 0.064*** 0.057*** 0.064*** 
(0.017) (0.024) (0.017) (0.024) 
Black (d) 0.243*** 0.287*** 0.240*** 0.279*** 
(0.017) (0.028) (0.017) (0.029) 
Hispanic (d) 0.111*** 0.186*** 0.115*** 0.191*** 
(0.024) (0.041) (0.024) (0.040) 
Percent of State 
Female 
0.007 -0.010 0.022+ 0.001 
(0.016) (0.024) (0.015) (0.025) 
Median age of State 0.001 -0.004 0.002 0.004 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
-0.185** -0.326*** -0.093 -0.197* 
(0.074) (0.117) (0.064) (0.102) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
0.330** 0.574***   
(0.145) (0.219)   
Population Density 
(1000 per square 
mile) 
0.902*** 1.320*** 0.475** 0.802*** 




-0.574*** -0.848***   






  0.022+ 0.062*** 
  (0.015) (0.022) 
Density*Median-10 
Ratio 
  -0.094** -0.163*** 
  (0.042) (0.060) 
R-squared 0.034 0.037 0.033 0.035 
N 5716 2451 5716 2451 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 







Table 3.17:  Ordered Probit Marginal Results for reducing income inequality for year 2000 using 
Annenberg (State Level) Survey Data 
(Standard Errors presented in Parentheses) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income (in $10000) -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.013*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Age -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female (d) 0.093*** 0.101*** 0.093*** 0.101*** 
(0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) 
Married (d) -0.029* -0.049* -0.030** -0.052** 
(0.015) (0.026) (0.015) (0.026) 
Church (d) -0.016 -0.006 -0.016 -0.009 
(0.020) (0.029) (0.020) (0.029) 
Every Week (d) -0.048** -0.004 -0.050** -0.010 
(0.020) (0.030) (0.020) (0.030) 
Dropout (d) 0.076*** -0.042 0.076*** -0.042 
(0.029) (0.075) (0.029) (0.075) 
College Degree (d) -0.077*** -0.068*** -0.076*** -0.064*** 
(0.017) (0.024) (0.017) (0.024) 
Advanced Degree 
(d) 
-0.024 0.001 -0.024 0.001 
(0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026) 
Black (d) 0.270*** 0.339*** 0.268*** 0.330*** 
(0.025) (0.045) (0.025) (0.045) 
Hispanic (d) 0.140*** 0.109** 0.145*** 0.116** 
(0.032) (0.054) (0.031) (0.054) 
Percent of State 
Female 
0.039** 0.059** 0.058*** 0.089*** 
(0.018) (0.027) (0.018) (0.027) 
Median age of State -0.004 -0.020** -0.003 -0.017* 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
-0.274*** -0.433*** -0.179** -0.277** 
(0.085) (0.124) (0.074) (0.108) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
0.205 0.391*   
(0.166) (0.234)   
Population Density 
(1000 per square 
mile) 
0.506* 0.883*** -0.044 0.150 




-0.316* -0.558***   






  -0.009 0.002 
  (0.017) (0.024) 
Density*Median-10 
Ratio 
  0.014 -0.027 
  (0.047) (0.062) 
R-squared 0.068 0.055 0.067 0.052 
N 5592 2423 5592 2423 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 










Table 3.18:  Sample Means and Sample Standard Deviations for Tables 16 and 17 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Healthcare/Inequality 0.573 0.520 0.456 0.366 
 (0.656) (0.678) (0.498) (0.482) 
Income (in $10000) 5.455 8.971 5.494 8.990 
 (3.969) (3.618) (3.987) (3.626) 
Age 48.740 46.839 48.610 46.719 
 (15.742) (12.551) (15.734) (12.558) 
Female (d) 0.551 0.490 0.550 0.487 
 (0.497) (0.500) (0.498) (0.500) 
Married (d) 0.639 0.801 0.639 0.801 
 (0.480) (0.399) (0.480) (0.399) 
Church (d) 0.407 0.428 0.411 0.429 
 (0.491) (0.495) (0.492) (0.495) 
Every Week (d) 0.422 0.408 0.418 0.407 
 (0.494) (0.492) (0.493) (0.491) 
Dropout (d) 0.071 0.018 0.068 0.018 
 (0.257) (0.134) (0.252) (0.132) 
College Degree (d) 0.281 0.365 0.284 0.365 
 (0.450) (0.481) (0.451) (0.482) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.171 0.287 0.175 0.287 
 (0.377) (0.452) (0.380) (0.452) 
Black (d) 0.072 0.050 0.072 0.050 
 (0.258) (0.218) (0.258) (0.218) 
Hispanic (d) 0.055 0.040 0.054 0.040 
 (0.228) (0.195) (0.226) (0.196) 
Percent of State 
Female 
50.957 50.964 50.952 50.961 
(0.619) (0.629) (0.620) (0.630) 
Median age of State 35.441 35.419 35.442 35.425 
 (1.818) (1.761) (1.815) (1.754) 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
0.352 0.362 0.351 0.361 
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
Income Inequality 
(Mean/Median) 
1.321 1.323 1.320 1.323 
(0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) 
Population Density 
(1000 per square 
mile) 
0.233 0.270 0.231 0.270 




0.317 0.369 0.314 0.369 




percentile of Income 
ratio 
3.981 4.004 3.978 4.001 
(0.687) (0.688) (0.685) (0.686) 
Obs. 5716 2451 5592 2423 
Note:  columns (1) and (2) refer to health insurance with the full sample and top half of income earners 
respectively.  Columns (3) and (4) refer to reducing income inequality with the full sample and top half of 









CHAPTER ONE APPENDIX 
Table 1.10:  NES (Congressional District) Marginal Effect of OLS Regression on Vote Choice 
0=Republican 1=Democrat 
(Std. Errors are presented in parenthesis and clustered by state for robustness) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income in $10000s -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married Female (d) 0.043+ 0.042 0.042+ 0.041 0.042+ 0.042 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Single Female (d) 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Married Male (d) -0.031 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Church Attendance (d) -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.066*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Church Every Week (d) -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.210*** -0.209*** -0.209*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
High School Dropout 
(d) 
0.065** 0.067** 0.065** 0.066** 0.064** 0.067** 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
College Degree (d) 0.046** 0.048** 0.047** 0.048** 0.046** 0.047** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Black (d) 0.488*** 0.488*** 0.489*** 0.489*** 0.486*** 0.487*** 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) 
Hispanic (d) 0.201*** 0.205*** 0.202*** 0.204*** 0.200*** 0.205*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Other Race (d) 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Year 2004 -0.058** -0.055* -0.056* -0.055* -0.059** -0.055* 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) 
Year 2008 -0.014 -0.009 -0.012 -0.008 -0.016 -0.009 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.032) (0.036) 
Female-Male Ratio of 
District 
-0.434+ -0.404 -0.430 -0.405 -0.435+ -0.394 
(0.285) (0.297) (0.313) (0.310) (0.291) (0.296) 
Median Age of District 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ethnic Fragmentation of 
District 
0.029 0.042 0.019 0.043 0.025 0.047 
(0.147) (0.145) (0.153) (0.147) (0.149) (0.144) 
Population Density 
(1000s/sq. mi.) 
0.005  0.017  0.009  






0.017      
(0.017)  






0.000 0.002**     
(0.001) (0.001) 
    
Mean Income/Median 
Income 
  0.089    






  -0.007 0.005*   








    0.004  









    -0.000 0.000** 
    
(0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.804*** 0.830*** 0.739** 0.830*** 0.824*** 0.823*** 
 (0.266) (0.258) (0.287) (0.266) (0.265) (0.258) 
R-squared 0.2338 0.2334 0.2334 0.233 0.2336 0.2331 
N 3082 3082 3082 3082 3082 3082 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note:  Each Regression uses the entire sample but a different measure of inequality.  Regressions (1) and 
(2) use poverty rate as the inequality measure, regressions (3) and (4) use median income divided by the 
10
th
 percentile of income, and regressions (5) and (6) use 90
th










Table 1.11:  NES (Congressional District) Marginal Effect of OLS Regression on Vote Choice 
0=Republican 1=Democrat 
(Std. Errors are presented in parenthesis and clustered by state for robustness) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income in $10000s -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married Female (d) 0.043+ 0.042 0.042+ 0.041 0.042+ 0.042 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Single Female (d) 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Married Male (d) -0.031 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Church Attendance (d) -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.066*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Church Every Week (d) -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.210*** -0.209*** -0.209*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
High School Dropout 
(d) 
0.065** 0.067** 0.065** 0.066** 0.064** 0.067** 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
College Degree (d) 0.046** 0.048** 0.047** 0.048** 0.046** 0.047** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Black (d) 0.488*** 0.488*** 0.489*** 0.489*** 0.486*** 0.487*** 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) 
Hispanic (d) 0.201*** 0.205*** 0.202*** 0.204*** 0.200*** 0.205*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Other Race (d) 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Year 2004 -0.058** -0.055* -0.056* -0.055* -0.059** -0.055* 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) 
Year 2008 -0.014 -0.009 -0.012 -0.008 -0.016 -0.009 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.032) (0.036) 
Female-Male Ratio of 
District 
-0.434+ -0.404 -0.430 -0.405 -0.435+ -0.394 
(0.285) (0.297) (0.313) (0.310) (0.291) (0.296) 
Median Age of District 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ethnic Fragmentation of 
District 
0.029 0.042 0.019 0.043 0.025 0.047 
(0.147) (0.145) (0.153) (0.147) (0.149) (0.144) 
Population Density 
(1000s/sq. mi.) 
0.005  0.017  0.009  






0.017      
(0.017)  






0.000 0.002**     
(0.001) (0.001) 
    
Mean Income/Median 
Income 
  0.089    
  (0.115)    
Mean Income/Median 
Income*Pop. Density 
  -0.007 0.005*   











    0.004  









    -0.000 0.000** 
    
(0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.804*** 0.830*** 0.739** 0.830*** 0.824*** 0.823*** 
 (0.266) (0.258) (0.287) (0.266) (0.265) (0.258) 
R-squared 0.2338 0.2334 0.2334 0.233 0.2336 0.2331 
N 3082 3082 3082 3082 3082 3082 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note:  Each Regression uses the entire sample but a different measure of inequality.  Regressions (1) and 
(2) use poverty rate as the inequality measure, regressions (3) and (4) use median income divided by the 
10
th
 percentile of income, and regressions (5) and (6) use 90
th









Table 1.12:  NES (Congressional District) Marginal Effect of OLS Regression on Vote Choice 
0=Republican 1=Democrat 
(Std. Errors are presented in parenthesis and clustered by state for robustness) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income in $10000s -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married Female (d) 0.043+ 0.042 0.042+ 0.041 0.042+ 0.042 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Single Female (d) 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Married Male (d) -0.031 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Church Attendance (d) -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.066*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Church Every Week (d) -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.210*** -0.209*** -0.209*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
High School Dropout 
(d) 
0.065** 0.067** 0.065** 0.066** 0.064** 0.067** 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
College Degree (d) 0.046** 0.048** 0.047** 0.048** 0.046** 0.047** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Advanced Degree (d) 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Black (d) 0.488*** 0.488*** 0.489*** 0.489*** 0.486*** 0.487*** 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) 
Hispanic (d) 0.201*** 0.205*** 0.202*** 0.204*** 0.200*** 0.205*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Other Race (d) 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Year 2004 -0.058** -0.055* -0.056* -0.055* -0.059** -0.055* 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) 
Year 2008 -0.014 -0.009 -0.012 -0.008 -0.016 -0.009 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.032) (0.036) 
Female-Male Ratio of 
District 
-0.434+ -0.404 -0.430 -0.405 -0.435+ -0.394 
(0.285) (0.297) (0.313) (0.310) (0.291) (0.296) 
Median Age of District 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ethnic Fragmentation of 
District 
0.029 0.042 0.019 0.043 0.025 0.047 
(0.147) (0.145) (0.153) (0.147) (0.149) (0.144) 
Population Density 
(1000s/sq. mi.) 
0.005  0.017  0.009  






0.017      
(0.017)  






0.000 0.002**     
(0.001) (0.001) 
    
Mean Income/Median 
Income 
  0.089    
  (0.115)    
Mean Income/Median 
Income*Pop. Density 
  -0.007 0.005*   











    0.004  









    -0.000 0.000** 
    
(0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.804*** 0.830*** 0.739** 0.830*** 0.824*** 0.823*** 
 (0.266) (0.258) (0.287) (0.266) (0.265) (0.258) 
R-squared 0.2338 0.2334 0.2334 0.233 0.2336 0.2331 
N 3082 3082 3082 3082 3082 3082 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note:  Each Regression uses the entire sample but a different measure of inequality.  Regressions (1) and 
(2) use poverty rate as the inequality measure, regressions (3) and (4) use median income divided by the 
10
th
 percentile of income, and regressions (5) and (6) use 90
th









CHAPTER TWO APPENDIX 
Table 2.8:  List of States with Constitutional Language regarding or Supreme Court Challenges  
to State’s Public Education 




Louisiana Arizona Illinois Arizona Alabama 
Montana Colorado Louisiana Colorado Arizona 
New Mexico Florida Montana Florida Arkansas 
North Carolina Idaho Virginia Georgia California 
 Indiana Washington Idaho Connecticut 
 Minnesota  Maryland Kentucky 
 Nevada  Minnesota Massachusetts 
 North Dakota  New Jersey Montana 
 Oregon  New Mexico New Hampshire 
 South Dakota  Ohio New Jersey 
 Texas  Pennsylvania North Carolina 
 Washington  Rhode Island Ohio 
 Wisconsin  South Dakota Texas 
 Wyoming  Texas Vermont 
   West Virginia Washington 
   Wyoming West Virginia 
















Table 2.9:  First-Stage Estimation of Regressions in Table 2.4 













Local Gov. Revenue 
per Student 
0.178*** 0.153** 0.174*** -0.523*** -0.120*** 
(0.029) (0.073) (0.032) (0.086) (0.042) 
Parent Revenue per 
Student 
-0.076* -0.121** 0.000 -0.207*** -0.095* 
(0.040) (0.055) (0.063) (0.062) (0.052) 
County Income 
Relative to State’s 
Median County -2.071*** -2.071*** -2.031*** -0.681** -1.432*** 




county  income) 
-0.601+ -1.947** -0.653 14.358*** -4.556*** 
(0.398) (0.896) (0.492) (1.719) (0.527) 
Strong Equity 0.420*** 0.896*** 0.316*** 0.000 0.372*** 
(0.078) (0.198) (0.086) (0.000) (0.081) 
Middle Equity -0.080+ -0.277* -0.041 1.101*** -0.049 
(0.055) (0.160) (0.059) (0.280) (0.058) 
High Adequacy -0.366*** -0.534*** -0.323*** -1.238*** -0.443*** 
(0.069) (0.165) (0.082) (0.152) (0.107) 
Medium Adequacy -0.179*** -0.240* -0.200*** -0.017 0.081+ 
(0.048) (0.141) (0.053) (0.214) (0.051) 
Supreme Ct. case 0.266*** 0.170+ 0.300*** 0.716*** 0.389*** 
(0.042) (0.106) (0.047) (0.170) (0.047) 
Counties per 1000s 
people 
-19.324*** -15.743*** -19.335*** 246.822*** -18.338*** 
(1.323) (4.716) (1.421) (26.309) (1.307) 
Constant 6.846*** 8.761*** 6.842*** -13.807*** 11.926*** 






Table 2.10:  First-Stage Estimation of Regressions in Table 2.6 
Variable All Counties 
Counties in States with 
greater than 88 counties 
Counties in States with 
Less than 88 Counties 
State Revenue Per 
Student    
Local Gov. Revenue per 
Student 
0.178*** -0.195*** 0.395*** 
(0.029) (0.039) (0.063) 
Parent Revenue per 
Student -0.076* -0.309*** -0.620*** 
 (0.040) (0.047) (0.099) 
County Income Relative 
to State’s Median County 
-2.071*** -1.138*** -2.521*** 
(0.104) (0.115) (0.216) 
State inequality (Mean 
county income/Median 
county  income) 
-0.601+ -6.447*** 1.291** 
(0.398) (1.301) (0.602) 
Strong Equity 0.420*** 0.119 1.761*** 
 (0.078) (0.207) (0.197) 
Middle Equity -0.080+ -0.403*** 0.510*** 
 (0.055) (0.156) (0.112) 
High Adequacy -0.366*** -0.042 -1.936*** 
 (0.069) (0.117) (0.195) 
Medium Adequacy -0.179*** 0.283*** -0.736*** 
 (0.048) (0.074) (0.081) 
Supreme Ct. case 0.266*** 0.576*** 0.638*** 
 (0.042) (0.125) (0.080) 
Counties per 1000s 
people -19.324*** -18.291*** -24.148*** 
 (1.323) (5.511) (1.849) 
Constant 6.846*** 14.339*** 4.391*** 
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